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I. INTRODUCTION
On the night of October 1, 2017, the sound of a machine gun could
be heard echoing throughout the Las Vegas Strip.1 What should
have been a fun, carefree night for country music fans attending the
Route 91 Harvest Music Festival in Las Vegas, Nevada, quickly
turned into a nightmare when gunman Steven Paddock smuggled
firearms into his thirty-second-floor Mandalay Bay Resort & Casino
hotel room, and shot into the crowd below,2 killing fifty-eight people
and injuring more than five hundred others.
3
After the Las Vegas Massacre, a Second Amendment debate was,
naturally, ignited once again on Capitol Hill, 4 however, one aspect
of the shooting's aftermath that has largely been left out of the dis-
cussion is the impact the massacre had on hotel security. Since the
Las Vegas Massacre, hotels in both Las Vegas and throughout the
country have begun implementing security measures to ensure the
safety of hotel guests.5 Given the nature of the situation, many ho-
tels' actions seem reasonable, however, these changes could poten-
tially be devastating to individual Fourth Amendment privacy
rights, as the Fourth Amendment of the United States' Constitution
gives heightened protections to individuals residing in their homes
or in home-like places,6 such as a hotel room.
7
The sanctity of the home has long been recognized by legislatures
and courts through the implementation of Fourth Amendment prin-
ciples, ensuring that search warrants are obtained before searches
1. Garrett Mitchell, 'A Sound I'll Never Forget'- Peoria Woman Recounts Las Vegas
Shooting, STAR PRESS (Oct. 4, 2017, 3:34 PM), https://mocux.thestarpress.com/story/news/lo-
cal/peoria/2 017/10/03/z-vegas -shooting-peoria-womans-harrowing-account/72850200 1/.
2. Isabel Dobrin & Tanya Ballard Brown, Las Vegas Massacre Raises Questions About
Hotel Security, NPR (Oct. 2, 2017, 3:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/10/02/555067087/las-
vegas-massacre-raises-questions-about-hotel-security.
3. Las Vegas Shooting Updates: Deadliest Mass Shooting in Modern U.S. History, BALT.
SUN (Oct. 5, 2017, 9:45 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nation-world/la-las-vegas-
shooting-live-updates-carnage-concert-leaves-50-dead- 100-injured-20171002-htmlstory.
html.
4. Rebecca Savransky, Dem Senator: 'How Many Lives Must Be Lost Before We Act?',
HILL (Oct. 2, 2017, 10:06 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/353402-dem-senator-how-
many-lives-must-be-lost-before-we-act; see also Max Greenwood, Dem Rep Slams Moments
of Silence, Urges Action After Las Vegas Shooting, HILL (Oct. 3, 2017, 10:27 AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/353597-dem-rep-slams-moments-of-silence-urges-action-
after-las-vegas-shooting.
5. Kate Taylor, The Las Vegas Shooting Could Completely Change How Hotels Think
About Security, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2017, 9:38 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/las-
vegas-shooting-changes-hotel-security-2017-10.
6. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
7. United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964)).
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and seizures are conducted within an individual's home or home-
like place.8 However, the horrific nature of the recent Las Vegas
shooting leaves open an important question: what is next for hotel
security in the United States? While there has been no congres-
sional attempt at this point to regulate this area, if events that en-
danger public safety such as the Las Vegas shooting continue to oc-
cur, it is likely only a matter of time until Congress will be forced to
take action. If Congress passes legislation requiring heightened se-
curity in hotels, and Congress struggles to strike an acceptable bal-
ance between individual liberties and public safety, the legislation
may have the potential to relax warrant requirements, weaken in-
dividual privacy rights, and jeopardize the greater Fourth Amend-
ment protections afforded to privacy within the home or home-like
places, such as hotel rooms.
In this article, I first discuss the history of protecting privacy
within the home and the Supreme Court's extension of that protec-
tion to hotel rooms. Next, I discuss the impact of the Las Vegas
Massacre on hotel security in the United States, followed by a dis-
cussion of how the international hotel industry has historically re-
sponded to terrorist attacks by increasing hotel security. I then dis-
cuss the United States' response to perhaps the most well-known
incident to endanger public safety in the United States: September
11, 2001. Accordingly, I demonstrate how, in the wake of that trag-
edy, Congress struggled to balance national security and individual
liberties when it hastily passed the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001,9 more commonly known as the USA
PATRIOT Act (hereinafter "PATRIOT Act"). 10
In the analysis section of this article, I propose ideal legislative
provisions for Congress to include in future legislation. While I do
not propose complete legislation, I propose provisions that I believe
have the potential to improve hotel security in the United States,
while preserving the Fourth Amendment rights of hotel guests. The
legislative provisions draw inspiration from the international hotel
8. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31; Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512.
9. See Andrew Glass, Bush Signs USA PATRIOT Act into Law, Oct. 26, 2001, POLITICO
(Oct. 26, 2015, 12:03 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/bush-signs-usa-patriot-
act-into-law-oct-26-2001-215030 (noting that President George W. Bush signed the
PATRIOT Act into law on October 26, 2001, which was only forty-five days after September
11).
10. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1).
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industry, from the mistakes of Congress post-September 11, 2001,
and from domestic airport security procedures.
I first suggest that Congress mandate that American hotels have
security stations at each hotel entrance where security guards are
professionally trained to use X-ray machines and metal detectors to
screen individuals and their luggage. Next, I suggest that the leg-
islation provide a comprehensive list of unauthorized items for ho-
tels and hotel rooms. While I do not propose a complete list of un-
authorized items, I recommend giving hotel guests leeway regard-
ing everyday items, while certain firearms and explosives should be
absolutely prohibited. I then propose that Congress mandate hotel
staff members to ensure that they are properly screening guests be-
fore they enter the hotel, and are trained to recognize suspicious
activity. I then propose that Congress include a provision in the
legislation that explicitly states that no hotel room can be searched
without probable cause, ensuring that hotel personnel do not au-
thorize warrantless searches of hotel rooms. My final suggestion is
that Congress create a governing body (a department, committee,
etc.) to oversee the newly implemented processes and to ensure
compliance.
Finally, I explain that, in the event that Congress passes legisla-
tion that infringes on individual Fourth Amendment privacy rights,
the last line of defense for individuals will be state constitutions
that offer greater Fourth Amendment protections to their citizens.
Citizens of Pennsylvania, for example, may be afforded greater
Fourth Amendment protections, while citizens of Florida will not
because the Florida Supreme Court has refused to broaden privacy
protections beyond those afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.12 Thus, this has the potential to be
problematic because it will leave some Americans turning to their
respective state courts for relief, while other Americans will not be
afforded the same opportunity.
11. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
12. Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 1988) (After the 1982 amendment o the
Florida Constiution, Florida courts were bound to follow the interpretations of the
United States Supreme Court with relation to the Fourth Amendment but could not provide
greater protections than those interpretations.).
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II. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS OF THE HOME & HOME-
LIKE PLACES
A. A Man is the "King"of His Own Castle
What exactly constitutes a "home?" Is a home where a man lays
his head at night? Must a home be a permanent place? Or can a
home be temporary in nature? The Supreme Court of the United
States has been called upon to answer many of the aforementioned
questions over the past few decades, however, the right to privacy
in the home or in home-like places has deep roots in both English
and American jurisprudence.
The idea that "a man's house is his castle"13 is a powerful concept
that is deeply embedded in English tradition. For example, the Earl
of Chatham, William Pitt, addressed the English House of Com-
mons to discuss the danger of admitting officers into private citi-
zens' houses.14 Pitt eloquently demonstrated the importance of res-
idential privacy in England:
'The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may
enter; but the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!'
15
Additionally, when the time came to form the United States of
America, the founding fathers kept in mind the idea that an indi-
vidual should be able to deny entry into his home to whomever he
wishes.16 In fact, to ensure that residential privacy would remain
a fundamental right for all American citizens, the founders codified
it as the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
13. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 598 (1980).
14. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
15. Id. (quoting William Pitt, Earl of Chatham on the occasion of a debate in Parliament).
16. The Founding Fathers placed the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV; see also The United States Bill of Rights: First 10 Amendments to the
Constitution, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/united-states-bill-rights-first-10-amendments-con
stitution (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
17
While the Fourth Amendment protects the home from unreason-
able searches and seizures, the Amendment's core principle allows
a man the opportunity to retreat into his home and be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.
18
In Silverman v. United States, the District of Columbia Police De-
partment used an amplifying device to both record and listen to the
petitioners' conversations in their home after the police suspected
that they were involved in illegal gambling activities.19 Accord-
ingly, the testimony regarding those conversations was admitted at
trial and played a substantial part in the petitioners' convictions.
20
However, the Supreme Court refused to allow the admission of evi-
dence gathered from the recorded conversations because "the offic-
ers overheard the petitioners' conversations only by usurping part
of the petitioners' house or office ... a usurpation that was effected
without their knowledge and without their consent."21 The Court
made this decision based upon precedent, as it had never before al-
lowed an officer who lacked a warrant or consent to enter a man's
home to secretly observe and relate what was seen or heard at the
individual's subsequent criminal trial.22 Additionally, the Court
emphasized the fact that the intrusion was directly related to the
defendant's home, stating "[t]he Fourth Amendment, and the per-
sonal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."
23
Additionally, in Payton v. New York,2 4 and its companion case,
People v. Riddick,2 5 the Supreme Court was called upon to examine
the constitutionality of two New York statutes that allowed police
to enter residences without search warrants to make felony ar-
rests.26 In Payton, police officers went to Payton's residence without
a search warrant.27 When there was no answer at the door, police
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
19. Id. at 506.
20. Id. at 507.
21. Id. at 511.
22. Id. at 512.
23. Id. at 511.
24. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
25. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated Riddick and Payton and issued only one
opinion. Id. at 579. For purposes of this article, the principles set forth by the Supreme
Court in its consolidated opinion will be referred to as Payton.
26. Payton, 445 U.S. at 574.
27. Id. at 576.
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officers broke down the door, entered the apartment, and seized ev-
idence in plain view that was later admitted as evidence in Payton's
criminal trial.28 In Riddick, the police arrived at Riddick's house
without a warrant and when Riddick's young son answered the
door, the police entered the house and seized illegal narcotics after
seeking Riddick inside.29 Riddick was later arrested and indicted
on narcotics charges.30 Accordingly, the Supreme Court consoli-
dated both of the aforementioned cases and issued one opinion.
3 1
In its analysis, the Court cited its previous decision in United
States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, noting that the "physical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is di-
rected."3 2 The Court also reasoned that entry into a home to search
for and to seize property justify the same level of constitutional pro-
tection.33 Further, the Court found the Second Circuit's reasoning
regarding warrantless intrusions in the home to be persuasive:
To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion at-
tendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the
home. This is simply too substantial an invasion to allow with-
out a warrant, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances,
even when it is accomplished under statutory authority and
when probable cause is clearly present.
34
The Court echoed this principle by reasoning that the Fourth
Amendment "draw[s] a firm line at the entrance to the house," and
"[a]bsent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably
be crossed without a warrant.3 5 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
held that the warrantless entries in both Payton and Riddick vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment.
36
B. Is a Man the "King"of His Own Hotel Room?
Historically, residential privacy has been considered sacrosanct.
However, whether Fourth Amendment protections extended to
28. Id. at 576-77.
29. Id. at 578.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 579.
32. Id. at 585-86 (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of
Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
33. Id. at 588.
34. Id. at 588-89 (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir. 1978)).
35. Id. at 590.
36. Id. at 603.
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"temporary" or "non-permanent" homes was the next logical ques-
tion for the Supreme Court. As previously mentioned, the Fourth
Amendment requires police officers or other governmental actors to
obtain a warrant before searching or seizing "persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects."37 While a hotel room and a permanent residence
are facially different, the Supreme Court extended Fourth Amend-
ment protections to individuals staying in hotel rooms as well.
38
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places, and explained that Fourth
Amendment protection depends on whether the individual seeking
the constitutional protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the invaded place.39 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has also
held that a hotel room is like a home until the guest's lease of the
room expires or the guest checks out,40 and the resident of a hotel
room has the same expectation of privacy as an individual within a
house.41 Further, just as an individual's home is protected from
warrantless intrusions, any lesser standard when applied to a hotel
room is presumptively unreasonable.
42
In United States v. Jeffers, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the warrantless search of a hotel room was uncon-
stitutional even though the police were granted entry by the hotel's
assistant manager.43 Jeffers was convicted of violating narcotics
laws after police conducted a warrantless search of the hotel room
where he was staying.44 After police suspected that Jeffers had
"some stuff stashed" in his hotel room at the Dunbar Hotel, they
went to his hotel room, knocked at the door, and when there was no
answer, asked the hotel's assistant manager for a key to the room.
45
The assistant manager unlocked the door and the police entered
Jeffer's hotel room, conducted a warrantless search, and subse-
quently discovered illegal narcotics.46 Jeffers was later arrested
and charged.47 The Supreme Court noted that if it were to hold that
37. United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. CONST. amend.
IV).
38. E.g. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966), Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483, 490 (1964), United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
39. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
40. United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 721 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Jeffers, 342 U.S. at
51-52).
41. See Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490.
42. State v. Miller, 602 N.E.2d 296, 301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (citing Middleburg Hts. v.
Theiss, 501 N.E.2d 1226, 1228-29 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)).
43. Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 50-51.
44. Id. at 49-50.
45. Id.




the search and seizure in this instance were lawful, it would essen-
tially overturn a principle designed to protect a fundamental pri-
vacy right.48 Accordingly, the Court held that the evidence discov-
ered during the warrantless search and seizure of Jeffer's hotel
room should be suppressed.49
Thirteen years later, in Stoner v. California, the Supreme Court
once again suppressed evidence resulting from a warrantless search
of a hotel room when the hotel's night clerk granted police officers
entry to Stoner's hotel room without his consent.50 The Pomona,
California Police Department received information that Stoner may
have been involved in a robbery that occurred earlier that day.5
1
Police officers then went to the Mayfair Hotel where Stoner was
staying and without Stoner's permission or consent, the hotel night
clerk unlocked his hotel room door and allowed the police to enter
his room.52 The police subsequently conducted a warrantless search
of the hotel room, and discovered evidence that linked Stoner to the
robbery.53 Additionally, the evidence seized from the room was used
against Stoner at his criminal trial.54 The Supreme Court noted
that in this case it was Stoner's [Fourth Amendment] right at stake,
"not the night clerk or the hotel's.'55 Further, the court explained
that because a guest in a hotel room is entitled to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, if the Court were to allow hotel
employees to have "unfettered discretion" in entering and granting
others permission to enter an individual's hotel room, it would in-
fringe upon hotel guests' Fourth Amendment rights.56 Thus, the
Court held that the warrantless search conducted by police was un-
constitutional and ordered that Stoner's conviction be set aside.
57
Based upon the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions, Fourth
Amendment protections have been extended to individuals staying
in hotel rooms.58  Therefore, because hotel guests are afforded
nearly the same Fourth Amendment protections that they would
receive in their home, if Congress chooses to pass legislation that
regulates hotel security in the United States, they must strike an
48. Id. at 52.
49. Id. at 54.
50. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 484-85 (1964).
51. Id. at 484-85.
52. Id. at 485.
53. Id. at 485-86.
54. Id. at 486.
55. Id. at 489.
56. Id. at 490.
57. Id. at 484.
58. E.g. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966); Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490; United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
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acceptable balance between public safety and protecting hotel
guests' Fourth Amendment rights in their hotel rooms.
111. UPPING THE ANTE: INCREASED HOTEL SECURITY IN THE
WAKE OF THE LAS VEGAS MASSACRE
Unfortunately, the Las Vegas Massacre was not the first mass
shooting to occur in the United States, but it is the deadliest.59 Pad-
dock had been a hotel guest at Mandalay Bay since September 28,
2017.60 After police entered Paddock's hotel room, they found an
"arsenal" of sixteen weapons stashed in the room.6 1 Police believed
that Paddock was able to get the vast amount of weapons into the
hotel without suspicion by putting the firearms in ten suitcases,
which he transported up to his thirty-second floor hotel room in or-
der to carry out the attack.
6 2
Accordingly, in the wake of the massacre, Mandalay Bay and
other Las Vegas hotels have increased security.6 3 Some Las Vegas
hotels have started requiring guests to walk through metal detec-
tors and put their luggage through x-ray machines.6 4 These secu-
rity measures appear to be warranted given the circumstances,
however, hotels must be sure to avoid infringing upon hotel guests'
individual privacy rights.6 5 While a search of Paddock's luggage
prior to check-in may have allowed Mandalay Bay personnel to dis-
cover the deadly weapons, such searches may be seen as intrusive
and invasive. Additionally, experts believe that using x-ray ma-
chines and metal detectors as security measures would be virtually
impossible long-term and would be burdensome to both hotel guests
and personnel.
66
59. Taylor, supra note 5; Kieran Corcoran, Updated: This Timeline Shows Exactly How
the Las Vegas Massacre Unfolded, Bus. INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2017 7:40 AM), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/timeline-shows-exactly-how-the-las-vegas-massacre-unfolded-20 17-10.
60. Michelle Gant, Las Vegas Shooting: Hotel Security a Concern, Expert Says Mandalay
Bay Was 'Soft Target', FOX NEWS (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/travel/las-vegas-
shooting-hotel-security-a-concern-expert-says-mandalay-bay-was-soft-target.
61. Lia Eustachewich & Danika Fears, Las Vegas Shooter Had Cache of Weapons in Ho-
tel Room, N.Y. POST (Oct. 2, 2017, 2:01 PM), http://nypost.com/2017/10/02/las-vegas-shooter-
had-cache-of- 19-weapons-in-hotel-room/.
62. Nancy Trejos, Hotel Security Under Scrutiny After Las Vegas Shooting, USA TODAY
(Oct. 4, 2017, 5:48 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/roadwarriorvoices/2017/10/
04/hotel-security-under-scrutiny-after-vegas-shooting/733004001/.
63. Taylor, supra note 5.
64. Id.
65. Dave Berman & Wayne T. Price, Tourist Spots Increase Visible Security but Look for
More Subtle Methods, USA TODAY (Oct. 3, 2017, 8:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/nation-now/2017/10/03/tourism -security/728172001/.
66. Andy Sheehan, Las Vegas Shooting Raises Questions About Hotel Security, CBS PITT.




Even as time passes and the Las Vegas Massacre becomes more
distant, discussions surrounding the future of hotel security in the
United States are inevitable. While there is currently no legislation
in the United States aimed at regulating hotel security, if mass
shootings, terrorist attacks, and other events that endanger public
safety continue to occur, we may see a push for legislation and reg-
ulation that has the potential to infringe upon hotel guests' Fourth
Amendment privacy rights.
IV. RAISING THEIR HAND: HOW THE INTERNATIONAL HOTEL
INDUSTRY HAS RESPONDED TO TERROR ATTACKS ON HOTELS
ABROAD
Unlike other industries, the hotel and hospitality industry is
largely inconsistent when it comes to hotel security.6 7 For example,
while some international hotels have historically implemented in-
vasive hotel security measures,68 the United States has opted for
less invasive, less restrictive measures.6 9 American hotels rarely
resort to using metal detectors and x-ray machines to ensure guests'
safety, while both methods are commonly used internationally.
7 0
Additionally, it is becoming increasingly common for hotels in other
countries to have armed guards on hotel premises, use vehicle bar-
ricades, and resort to other extreme security measures to reduce the
risk of an attack.7 1 In contrast, such practices are unheard of in the
United States.
7 2
Often, hotels are seen as "soft target[s]" and tend to be vulnerable
to safety and security threats such as terrorism, natural disasters,
and other crimes.7 3 Accordingly, because hotels have become the
target of more bombings and terrorist attacks abroad, invasive se-
curity screenings when hotel guests check in have become a way of
life in countries such as Indonesia, Israel, and Egypt.74 In 2003,
terrorists set off a car bomb in a Marriot in Jakarta, Indonesia,
67. Paul Moxness, The Evolution of Hotel Security, CIPHER BRIEF (Dec. 18, 2015), https:I
www.thecipherbrief.com/the-evolution-of-hotel-security.
68. Tiffany Hsu, Las Vegas Shooting Underscores Hotel Security Choices, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/O2/business/hotel-security-las-vegas.html.
69. See Kelvin Chan & David Koenig, For Many Hotels, Terror Risks Make Tight Security




72. See generally Chan & Koenig, supra note 69.
73. Karam Mansour Ghazi, Safety and Security Measures in Egyptian Hotels, 4 J. HOTEL
& Bus. MGMT. 1, 2 (2015).
74. Hsu, supra note 68.
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which resulted in twelve fatalities.75 Then, in 2009, terrorists again
set off explosives in major Jakarta hotels, leaving eight people
dead.76 Since both of the aforementioned incidents, Indonesian ho-
tels have strengthened hotel security in order to ensure guests'
safety.
77
Additionally, after a 2008 terrorist attack in India that resulted
in more than one-hundred fatalities, the hotel industry in that re-
gion responded accordingly.78 Major hotel chains began using x-ray
systems and explosive trace detectors in hotels across India, and
the Lemon Tree Premier Hotel in New Delhi even trained employ-
ees to use facial-recognition software to identify any person who en-
tered onto the hotel's premises.79 Furthermore, the King David Ho-
tel in Jerusalem80 has taken hotel security measures to even greater
extremes. Due to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the King
David Hotel, which is a frequent destination for world leaders, "re-
portedly uses infrared cameras carried by balloons and robots in
sewers to search for bombs.81 The hotel also has an air condition-
ing system that prevents the spread of poisonous gas, and has in-
stalled windows that can withstand gunfire.
8 2
As terrorist attacks on hotels abroad have become more com-
mon,83 the international hotel industry has been both responsive
and innovative when implementing hotel security measures after
terrorist attacks. Bjorn Hanson, professor of hospitality and tour-
ism at New York University, commented after the Las Vegas Mas-
sacre that despite the horrific nature of the Las Vegas Massacre, he
did not think that metal detectors or x-ray machines would become
common hotel security measures in United States hotels.8 4 Rather,
he believed more hotels would simply begin using security cameras
and would become more sensitive to guests who checked in with
large packages.8 5 While it may be premature to suggest that the
United States adopt the extreme security measures used by inter-
national hotels, there may come a time when Congress will be
75. Chan & Koenig, supra note 69.
76. Id.
77. Id. (Indonesian hotels have strengthened hotel security by inspecting vehicles, scan-
ning luggage with x-ray machines, and installing more security cameras.).
78. Hsu, supra note 68.
79. Id.
80. Chan & Koenig, supra note 69.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. In the six-year period from 2003-2009, there were at least three high-profile terrorist
attacks on hotels abroad. See Chan & Koenig, supra note 69; Hsu, supra note 68.




forced to look to the international hotel industry for guidance when
drafting legislation to regulate hotel security in America's hospital-
ity industry.
V. FOLDING THEIR HAND: HOW THE UNITED STATES HAS
RESPONDED TO DOMESTIC TERROR ATTACKS-THE PATRIOT ACT'S
DEVASTATING EFFECTS ON FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY RIGHTS
Historically, there has been a balancing act in our society be-
tween individual privacy rights and public safety.86 After incidents
that jeopardize public safety, the Fourth Amendment is more likely
to yield to legislation that puts individual Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy rights at-risk. Perhaps the best example of the aforemen-
tioned principle is the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the
subsequent enactment of the PATRIOT Act.
8 7
On September 11, 2001, four United States commercial planes
were hijacked by nineteen members of the al Queda terrorist group
led by the now-deceased al Queda leader, Osama bin Ladin.88 Two
of the hijacked planes crashed into the north and south towers of
the World Trade Center in New York City, another plane crashed
into the Pentagon in Washington D.C., and a fourth plane crashed
in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.8 9 While the devastating
events of September 11, 2001, resulted in 2,977 fatalities,90 the
tragedy left America in shock and demanding answers, as it became
apparent that America was not unsusceptible to foreign terrorist
attacks.
The events of September 11, 2001 left Americans and politicians
alike asking questions about the effectiveness of the country's coun-
terterrorism efforts. Accordingly, Congress acted swiftly and intro-
duced the PATRIOT Act.91 On October 26, 2001, President George
86. See United States. v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297,
314-15 (1972) (noting that "the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms, our task is
to examine and balance the basic values at stake in this case: the duty of Government to
protect the domestic security, and the potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance
to individual privacy and free expression").
87. PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1).




91. PATRIOT Act of 2001, 115 Stat. 272; see also Peter Baker, In Debate Over Patriot
Act, Lawmakers Weigh Risks us. Liberty, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2015), https://www.ny-
times.com/2015/06/02/us/politics/in-debate-over-patriot-act-lawmakers-weigh-risks-vs-lib-
erty.html (noting that only one senator voted against the PATRIOT Act, as they felt that the
Act was a violation of civil liberties).
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W. Bush signed the Act into law.92 On its face, the PATRIOT Act
simply appeared to provide law enforcement with the necessary
tools to prevent future terrorist attacks from occurring on American
soil.9 3 However, the PATRIOT Act ended up being the first of many
changes to surveillance laws that allowed the U.S. government to
intrude upon the civil liberties of ordinary Americans by expanding
the government's authority to monitor phone calls, e-mails, bank
records, credit reports, and individual internet activity.94 The
PATRIOT Act also allowed law enforcement to "better observe the
conduct of individuals through sophisticated surveillance devices,
including monitoring, tracking, searching a suspect's computer
movements, and eavesdropping on communications with other com-
puter users."95 Therefore, while the PATRIOT Act was enacted in
order to prevent future terrorist attacks, it also had the effect of
eroding civil liberties afforded to American citizens by the United
States Constitution.
In contrast to the haste in which the PATRIOT Act was passed,
Congress extensively deliberated over the PATRIOT Act's predeces-
sor, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (hereinafter
"FISA").96 In 1978, Congress enacted FISA to "provide legislative
authorization and regulation for all electronic surveillance con-
ducted within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes."97
While Congress rushed to pass the PATRIOT Act post-September
11, 2001,98 Congress extensively deliberated before passing FISA.99
When deciding how much authority should be given to national se-
curity surveillance, Congress strived to achieve an adequate bal-
ance between national security and civil liberties.100 Accordingly,
FISA's legislative provisions were much more protective of individ-
ual privacy rights than those in the PATRIOT Act, as the PATRIOT
92. Glass, supra note 9.
93. Emanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United
States: The Aftermath of September 11, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 2 (2002).
94. Surveillance Under the Patriot Act, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/
issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/surveillance -under-patriot-act (last visited
Jan. 11, 2018).
95. Gross, supra note 93, at 1-2.
96. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1801).
97. See David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of the FISA Wall, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 487,
487 (2006) (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973,
3977).
98. Surveillance Under the Patriot Act, supra note 94.
99. Kelly R. Cusick, Thwarting Ideological Terrorism: Are We Brave Enough to Maintain





Act expanded FISA by authorizing more intrusive procedures to en-
sure national security.10 1 For example, the PATRIOT Act expanded
FISA by authorizing roving wiretaps, orders to obtain "any tangible
things" without requiring individual suspicion, and warrantless
wiretaps when the primary purpose is for criminal investigation.
102
Perhaps instead of hastily passing the PATRIOT Act a mere forty-
five days after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,10 3 Congress
could have taken more time to consider how to achieve balance be-
tween adequate protection and civil liberties, as they did when
passing FISA nearly three decades earlier.
Keeping the Fourth Amendment in mind, Congress had an obli-
gation to balance individual citizens' Fourth Amendment rights
with national security. Unfortunately, when faced with this task,
Congress struggled to strike an acceptable balance,104 and innocent
Americans have been forced to pay the price. Overall, the American
public has never supported the government monitoring personal
phone calls or emails.10 5 In fact, a survey conducted on the tenth
anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks indicated
that only 29% of Americans who were surveyed favored "the U.S.
government monitoring personal telephone calls and emails" in or-
der to curb terrorism, and that particular question drew less sup-
port than the other anti-terror tactics asked about in the same sur-
vey.106 Additionally, when it came to civil liberties, fewer Ameri-
cans thought it was necessary to sacrifice civil liberties in order to
combat terrorism than they did immediately after the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks.10 7 In a study conducted immediately af-
ter September 11, 2001, but before the enactment of the PATRIOT
Act, 55% of individuals surveyed thought it was necessary for Amer-
icans to give up civil liberties in order to ensure national security,
while 35% of those surveyed believed it was not.108 To the contrary,
101. Jeremy C. Smith, The USA PATRIOTAct: Violating Reasonable Expectations of Pri-
vacy Protected by the Fourth Amendment Without Advancing National Security, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 412, 417 (2003).
102. Id. (The following provisions of FISA were expanded upon by the Patriot Act: 50
U.S.C. §1805(c)(2)(B); 50 U.S.C. §§1861-1862; 50 U.S.C. §1804(a)(7)(B)).
103. Surveillance Under the Patriot Act, supra note 94.
104. Cusick, supra note 99, at 56.
105. Carroll Doherty, Balancing Act: National Security and Civil Liberties in Post-9/11
Era, PEWRES. CTR. (June 7, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/O6/O7/balanc-
ing-act-national-security-and-civil-liberties-in-post-91 -era/.
106. Id. (other anti-terror tactics that were surveyed include: requiring all citizens to carry
a national identification card at all times, requiring extra airport checks for individuals who






in a poll conducted shortly before the tenth anniversary of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, 40% of individuals surveyed believed that "in order to
curb terrorism in this country it will be necessary for the average
person to give up some civil liberties," while the majority of individ-
uals surveyed, 54%, said it would not.10 9 Moreover, the statistics
overwhelmingly indicate that, while Americans are concerned
about national security, they disfavor government action that is
considered intrusive and fails to preserve civil liberties.1 1 0
Rather than learning from past legislative mistakes, conflict be-
tween the government's right to protect national security and citi-
zens' right to privacy continues to frustrate the legal system.1
Similar to what occurred in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, if
American hotels continue to be soft targets for terrorist attacks,
Congress will likely be pressured to pass legislation that strength-
ens hotel security in order to preserve national security. When, and
if, Congress finds itself in this predicament, Congress's solution
should keep the founding fathers' vision in mind and strike an ac-
ceptable balance between Fourth Amendment rights and public
safety.
VI. ANALYSIS-PLACING MY BET: IDEAL LEGISLATION PROPOSED
There is no denying that the Las Vegas Massacre was the most
devastating shooting in modern-day U.S. history.11 2 While the trag-
edy left America mourning the fifty-eight lives lost that October
night, it also raised some red flags when it comes to gun control and
hotel security.1 13 Although members of Congress chose to ignore
the inadequacy of hotel security measures in the wake of the mas-
sacre,11 4 if hotels continue to be soft targets for terrorist attacks,
there may come a time when lawmakers will be forced to pass leg-
islation that regulates hotel security in the United States.
Ideal legislative provisions would take into account both the need
to protect hotel guests and the need to preserve individual liberties,
particularly hotel guests' Fourth Amendment rights while staying
in hotel rooms. Because Congress missed the mark when drafting
109. Id.
110. Seegenerally id.
111. J. Alexandra Bruce, Is Uncle Sam Stalking You?Abandoning Warrantless Electronic
Surveillance to Preclude Intrusive Government Searches, 6 J. L. & CYBER WARFARE 51, 53
(2017).
112. Taylor, supra note 5.
113. Id.
114. See generally Greenwood, supra note 4; Savransky, supra note 4. Both of these
sources demonstrate that in the wake of the massacre, Capitol Hill was primarily concerned
about gun control issues and was virtually silent on the topic of hotel security.
340 Vol. 57
Domestic Hotel Security
the PATRIOT Act post-September 11, 2001,115 I propose legislative
provisions for Congress to include in future legislation. Accord-
ingly, the suggested provisions take inspiration from the interna-
tional 21hotel industry, from Congress' mistakes post-September
11, 2001, and from domestic airport security procedures.
While convenience is certainly important to American travelers,
public safety, and national security, individual liberties should be
the main factors that Congress considers when drafting legislation
that regulates hotel security. Accordingly, these factors will also
drive my analysis. The first provision that Congress should include
in future legislation is the implementation of security stations at
each hotel entrance. Ideally, these security stations will employ
professionally trained security guards and use x-ray machines and
metal detectors to screen individuals and their luggage. Congress
should take inspiration for the security stations from the interna-
tional hotel industry, as it is common practice for international ho-
tels to have similar checkpoints where guests and their bags are
screened before entering the hotel.116 While acknowledging the fact
that this process may be seen as intrusive, burdensome, and may
make traveling less convenient for Americans, more importantly,
the security procedures would increase public safety and likely
lower the risk of warrantless entry into guests' hotel rooms because
guests will be screened immediately after they enter the hotel.
Experts, however, believe that using x-ray machines and metal
detectors as security measures would be virtually impossible long-
term and would be burdensome to both hotel guests and person-
nel.117 Jim Stover, a senior vice president of the real estate and
hospitality practice at Arthur J. Gallagher & Company, noted after
the Las Vegas Massacre that explosive scanners and x-ray ma-
chines would likely not be adopted by American hotels due to pri-
vacy concerns.118 However, while experts believe that having x-ray
machines and metal detectors in hotels would be too burdensome
for hotel guests, it is important to acknowledge that the United
States implemented similar security measures in airports after
115. PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1).
116. See generally Chan & Koenig, supra note 69.
117. Sheehan, supra note 66.
118. Hotels Take New Look at Security After Las Vegas, but Will Customers Sacrifice Pri-




September 11, 2001, and American travelers have acclimated ac-
cordingly.119
After September 11, 2001, Congress swiftly federalized domestic
airport security by enacting the Aviation and Transportation Secu-
rity Act (hereinafter "ATSA"). 120 ATSA initiated a "fundamental
change in the way [the U.S. government] approaches the task of
ensuring the safety and security of the civil air transportation sys-
tem,"1121 and transferred control of airport security to the Transpor-
tation Security Administration (hereinafter "the TSA"). 122 Before
September 11, 2001, airport security measures were much more re-
laxed; however, over the past seventeen years, more innovative and
intrusive technology has been used to screen airline passengers.123
Perhaps the most advanced and the most controversial is the full-
body scanning machine that the TSA uses to detect weapons and
explosives on individuals.124 While these full body scanning ma-
chines initially incited criticism from travelers who were concerned
about their privacy,125 the machines are still being used in airports
today.126 Further, the TSA has increasingly restricted passengers
from bringing particular weapons and even everyday items aboard
an airplane. Prior to 2001, blades up to four inches long were al-
lowed aboard a plane, in addition to baseball bats, box cutters,
darts, and scissors.127 Consequently, many of these items were
banned from flights in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.128 De-
spite the aforementioned restrictions, however, Americans still
choose air travel as a primary method of transportation.
129
119. See Tobias W. Mock, The TSA's New X-ray Vision: The Fourth Amendment Implica-
tions of "Body-Scan" Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints, 49 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 213, 215 (2009).
120. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101); see also Mock, supra note 119.
121. Mock, supra note 119.
122. Id.
123. See generally Andrea Leinfelder, Post-9/11 Airport Security Evolves, As Do the
Threats, HOUSTON CHRON. (Sept. 10, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
business/article/Post-9- 1 l-airport-security-evolves-as-do-the- 921292 7.php.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Kathleen Crislip, Airport TSA Backscatter or Body Scanning Machines, TRIPSAVY
(Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.tripsavvy.com/tsa-backscatter-or-body-imaging-x-ray-machines
-3150258.
127. Lydia O'Connor, This Is What it Was Like to Go to the Airport Before 9111,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2016, 2:36 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/airports-
before-911 us 57c85e17e4b078581flla133.
128. Id.
129. See generally Air Traffic by the Numbers, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.
gov/air-traffic/by-the numbers/ (last updated Nov. 26, 2018, 11:02 AM).
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The next legislative provision I suggest is that Congress draft a
comprehensive list of unauthorized items for hotel guests. This list
should be included in the actual piece of legislation, each hotel
should be mandated to publish the list on their website, and hotel
guests ideally should be required to sign a waiver before booking
their room(s), which would prompt the guest to agree to the initial
security screening and not to bring unauthorized items onto hotel
premises. While I do not propose a complete list of unauthorized
items in this article, I will provide suggestions and guidelines for
Congress.
First, Congress should use the TSA's list of unauthorized items
and modify it accordingly.130 When drafting legislation, Congress
should also keep in mind that individuals who are traveling may
choose to drive rather than fly because they prefer to travel with
items that may be prohibited on airplanes. Accordingly, the list of
unauthorized items on hotel premises should be less restrictive
than TSA's unauthorized items. Ideally, hotel guests would be per-
mitted to bring everyday items with them to hotels that may be pro-
hibited on airplanes (i.e. full-sized toiletries, small scissors, aerosol
cans, Swiss army knives, pepper spray and other self-defense
sprays, etc.). Additionally, because hotels are considered temporary
homes for guest staying for long durations, creating a flexible list of
authorized items for hotel guests is appropriate.
However, while hotel guests should have more flexibility bringing
everyday items into the hotel, guests should be required to follow
appropriate check-in procedures for firearms and explosives that
Congress may choose to permit on hotel premises. Ideally, the leg-
islation would require that these objects be kept in an authorized
area under hotel personnel supervision until the guest either checks
out the item (and immediately exits the premises), or the guest com-
pletes his or her stay. Further, based on the TSA's authorized and
unauthorized items list,121 items guests should be allowed to bring
into hotels (as long as the guest complies with proper check-in pro-
cedures and the items are subsequently placed into an authorized
area on hotel premises) are: axes/hatchets, BB guns, billy clubs,
bows and arrows, box cutters, brass knuckles, firearms, flare guns,
ice picks, martial arts weapons, meat cleavers, nail guns, parts of
guns and firearms, pellet guns, rifles, screwdrivers/tools, stun
gun/shocking devices, and swords.132 Additionally, guests should be
130. See What Can I Bring?, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-





absolutely prohibited from bringing the following items: blasting
caps, dynamite, firecrackers, fireworks, gas torches, gasoline, gun
powder, hand grenades, realistic replicas of explosives, realistic rep-
licas of firearms, and sparklers133 When it comes time for Congress
to draft comprehensive lists of unauthorized objects, because hotels
are considered temporary homes for some guests who may stay for
long durations, it will be important for Congress to be more flexible
when determining what items guests are permitted and prohibited
on hotel premises.
Further, in order to ensure that none of the aforementioned items
brought by hotel guests will be used to carry out an attack, it is
absolutely imperative that hotels employ properly trained hotel
personnel and security guards. My next suggested provision urges
Congress to mandate that hotel personnel complete safety train-
ing(s) and get specific certifications to ensure that hotel staff mem-
bers are properly checking in and storing the authorized items. Ho-
tel staff members should also be trained to recognize suspicious ac-
tivity. In fact, Mac Segal, head of hotel security consulting for the
global security firm AS Solution, maintained that the best way to
prevent future terror attacks is by having a well-trained hotel staff,
and noted that "every hotel employee, from housekeeping to black-
jack dealers" should be trained to recognize "suspicious indicators"
of an attack.13 4 Additionally, transport security officers in airports
go through extensive training and testing.13 5 In fact, transport se-
curity officers must complete a minimum of forty hours of classroom
training and sixty hours of on-the-job training to become a certified
transport security officer.136 These security officers also must pass
a "standard operating procedures knowledge test, an image certifi-
cation test, and a practical skills demonstration" annually to be-
come recertified.13 7 While I do not propose training requirements
for each hotel employee and security guard, Congress should con-
sult with experts from the international and domestic hospitality
industry and look to the TSA's requirements for transportation se-
curity officers when determining what certification standards are
appropriate for hotel staff members.
Next, I propose that Congress include a special provision in the
legislation that explicitly states that no hotel room can be searched
133. Id.
134. Dave Roos, Hotels Security Experts Warn About Learning the Wrong Lessons in Wake
ofLas Vegas Shooting, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Oct. 13, 2017), https://people.howstuffworks.com/
hotel-nsecurity-experts-warn-wrong-lessons-in-wake-las-vegas-shooting.htm.
135. See Mock, supra note 119, at 216-17.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 217.
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without probable cause. While limiting the dangerous items that
can be brought on the hotel premises and mandating that hotels
have security stations at each entrance, the probability of danger-
ous contraband making it into a guest's hotel room will likely be
significantly reduced, however, because hotel rooms have granted
the same Fourth Amendment protections as a home,138 the provi-
sion would ensure that hotels will not take advantage of newly im-
plemented security measures and allow police to conduct warrant-
less searches of hotel rooms.
Further, if Congress passes legislation that regulates hotel secu-
rity, in order for it to be effective, it is imperative that all American
hotels comply with the potential legislation. This will most likely
require Congress to create a governing body, like a department or
committee, to oversee the newly implemented processes and ensure
compliance. It is best for Congress to create universal hotel security
standards/procedures and subsequently mandate that hotels com-
ply with those standards rather than leaving it to the courts to de-
cide when hotels have failed to comply or leaving it for guests to
decide which hotels they would like to stay at based on the intru-
sivity of their security measures. Congress has the time and re-
sources to create a comprehensive piece of legislation that considers
all competing issues, while courts and individual hotels do not have
the same resources at their disposal. Further, it is necessary for
Congress to create and implement he legislation in order to pre-
vent economic advantage or disadvantage to particular hotels. For
example, if the decision is left up to individual hotels to decide
whether they want to increase security measures, a hotel that im-
plements security procedures may be economically disadvantaged
compared to a hotel that does not, as travelers may opt to stay at
the hotel where they would not have to be subjected to security
screenings. On the other hand, a hotel that implements security
procedures may have an economic advantage compared to a hotel
that does not, as travelers may opt to stay at the hotel where they
feel safer and more protected. Therefore, in order to create effective
legislation that evens the playing field for hotels, Congress should
be the lawmaking body to create the legislation, while a committee
or department, also created by Congress, would carry out Congress'
objectives and ensure that all American hotels comply with the new
legislation.
138. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,
490 (1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
Summer 2019 345
Duquesne Law Review
VII. RED OR BLACK?: PLAYING ROULETTE BY RELYING ON
INDIVIDUAL STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR HEIGHTENED FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a
constitutional floor, rather than a ceiling, and states are free to pro-
vide their citizens with protections broader than those guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment.13 9 If Congress passes legislation that
increases hotel security measures while simultaneously infringing
upon Fourth Amendment privacy rights, individuals may rely on
their state constitutions as a last line of defense. This is not an
ideal solution, however, as citizens of some states may be afforded
greater Fourth Amendment protections than others. For example,
while Pennsylvania citizens would be able to take advantage of the
greater Fourth Amendment protections afforded by their respective
state constitution,140 Florida citizens would be unable to do so, as
Florida's constitution offers no additional privacy protections be-
yond those included in the Fourth Amendment.
141
The Pennsylvania Constitution, more specifically the Fourth
Amendment, has often been found to be more protective of individ-
ual rights and liberties than the U.S. Constitution.142 Shockingly,
when the U.S. Constitution was adopted, there was no provision
that protected citizens from searches and seizures.143 In fact, when
the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution was being
drafted, it was modeled in part from the Declarations of Rights in
the Pennsylvania Constitution, particularly in regard to the war-
rantless searches and seizures provision.144
Further, Pennsylvania's constitution, enacted in 1776, is one of
the oldest state constitutions and has remained essentially un-
changed, especially with regards to its criminal procedure provi-
sions, since then.145 For example, in Commonwealth v. Sell, the
139. Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Fourth Amendment Protections, and Equivalent
State Constitutional Protections, as Applied to the Use of GPS Technology, Transponder, or
the Like, to Monitor Location and Movement of Motor Vehicle, Aircraft, or Watercraft, 5 A.L.R.
6th 385 (2005) (noting that "[s]tate constitutional provisions also provide commensurate pro-
tections, and some states provide protections which have been held to be broader than those
imposed by the Fourth Amendment").
140. See PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
141. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (amended 1982).
142. See Commonwealth v. Waltson, 724 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1998).
143. Lindsay J. Gus, The Forgotten Residents: Defining the Fourth Amendment "House" to
the Detriment of the Homeless, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 769, 773 (2016).
144. Commonwealth v. Edmonds, 586 A.2d 887, 896 (Pa. 1991).
145. Francis Barry McCarthy, Counterfeit Interpretations of State Constitutions in Crim-
inal Procedure, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 79, 80-81 (2007).
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed how the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution has historically protected individual privacy rights: "[S]ur-
vival of the language now employed in Article I, Section 8 through
over 200 years of profound change in other areas demonstrates that
the paramount concern for privacy first adopted as a part of our
organic law in 1776 continues to enjoy the mandate of the people of
this Commonwealth.' 146 Accordingly, the original version of Penn-
sylvania's search and seizure provision read:
The people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, pa-
pers and possessions free from search and seizure, and there-
fore warrants without oaths or affirmations first made, afford-
ing sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any officer or
messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected
places, or to seize any person or persons, his or their property,
not particularly described, are contrary to that right and ought
not be granted.
147
Today, Pennsylvania's search and seizure provision is codified in
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and reads:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no
warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things
shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation sub-
scribed to by the affiant.
1 48
Additionally, while Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution are nearly identical, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
previously decided that Article I, Section 8 provides "differ-
ent, greater, or more heightened protection than that of the Fourth
Amendment.' 149 Thus, a citizen of Pennsylvania may be able to
seek relief in state court if Congress passes intrusive legislation
146. Edmonds, 586 A.2d at 897 (quoting Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (Pa.
1983)).
147. Id. at 896-97 (This constitutional provision was reworded when the Pennsylvania
Constitution was extensively revised in 1790, and reappeared as PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8.).
148. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
149. McCarthy, supra note 145, at 88; see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 836 A.2d 893,
902 (Pa. 2003) (noting that "[w]hen examining the text of Article I, Section 8, this Court has
repeatedly stated that this constitutional provision embodies a strong notion of privacy, and
has held that the section often provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution").
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that regulates hotel security and infringes on Fourth Amendment
privacy rights at the same time.
Conversely, the Florida Constitution offers citizens less Fourth
Amendment protections than the Pennsylvania Constitution.
150
The 1982 amendment o Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Consti-
tution mandated that Florida courts follow the United States Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.151 Accord-
ingly, Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and against the unreasonable interception of private commu-
nications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall
be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit,
particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the
person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communica-
tion to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be ob-
tained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the
4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or infor-
mation obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissi-
ble in evidence if such articles or information would be inad-
missible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court
construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. 
152
Prior to passage of the 1982 amendment, Florida courts "were
free to provide its citizens with a higher standard of protection from
governmental intrusion than that afforded by the [F]ederal [C]on-
stitution.' 153 After the 1982 amendment, however, Florida courts
were bound to follow the interpretations of the United States Su-
preme Court with relation to the Fourth Amendment but could not
provide greater protections than those interpretations.1 54
Thus, if Congress passes legislation that regulates hotel security
while simultaneously intruding upon individual Fourth Amend-
ment liberties, citizens hoping to protect their Fourth Amendment
rights would first have to determine where their state constitution
falls on the spectrum of constitutional protections. Accordingly, a
Florida citizen seeking Fourth Amendment protection from the
150. Compare FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (amended 1982), with PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
151. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (amended 1982).
152. Id.
153. State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 1983).
154. Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 1988).
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Florida Constitution may face greater challenges than a similarly
situated Pennsylvania citizen who can rely on the Pennsylvania
Constitution for relief. To avoid this confusion, Congress should
strive to pass legislation that balances both the need to ensure pub-
lic safety and the constitutional obligation to preserve Fourth
Amendment privacy rights of Americans.
VIII. CONCLUSION-ALL CARDS ON THE TABLE
In the aftermath of the Las Vegas Massacre, instead of shifting
legislative focus toward the inadequacy of hotel security in United
States hotels, a Second Amendment debate ignited on Capitol Hill
once again.155 While Congress may have turned a blind eye this
time, if hotels continue to be popular targets for gun violence and
terrorist attacks, hard discussions regarding increased hotel secu-
rity measures are likely inevitable on Capitol Hill. If and when the
time comes to draft legislation with respect to hotel security, Con-
gress will be faced with the task of balancing public safety and the
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens. However, this task is not to
be taken lightly, as the right to privacy in one's home is both fun-
damental and sacrosanct,156 and the Supreme Court of the United
States has extended those same Fourth Amendment protections to
hotel rooms.15
7
When drafting legislation that increases hotel security in Ameri-
can hotels, ideal legislative provisions would take into account both
the need to protect hotel guests and the need to preserve individual
liberties, particularly hotel guests' Fourth Amendment rights while
staying in hotel rooms. As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, a consti-
tutional law scholar and the Dean of Berkeley School of Law
stated,158 "[s]ome loss of freedom may be necessary to ensure secu-
rity; but not every sacrifice of liberty is warranted ... The central
question must be what rights need to be sacrificed, under what cir-
cumstances, and for what gain.' 159 While I cannot predict the fu-
ture, one can only hope that if Congress passes legislation regulat-
ing hotel security, they will preserve the integrity of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, honor the wishes of
155. Savransky, supra note 4.
156. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
157. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,
490 (1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
158. Susan Gluss, Erwin Chemerinsky is New Dean of Berkeley Law, BERKELEY L. (May
17, 2017), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/article/erwin-chemerinsky-new-dean-berkeley-law/.





and ensure hotel guests' privacy in their hotel
160. Since the Las Vegas Massacre, more than 2,500 lawsuits have been filed against
MGM Resorts International, the parent company that owns Mandalay Bay Hotel and Casino
in Las Vegas, Nevada, claiming that MGM is responsible for "deaths, injuries, and emotional
distress resulting" from the Massacre. Joshua Barajas, MGM's Lawsuit Against Shooting
Victims, Explained, PBS (July 18, 2018, 9:20 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/na-
tion/mgms-lawsuit-against-las-vegas-shooting-victims-explained. On July 13, 2018, MGM
Resorts filed a lawsuit against victims of the Las Vegas Massacre, claiming that they have
"no liability of any kind" to the shooting victims because security services for the Route 91
Harvest Music Festival were provided by Contemporary Services Corporation, a security
company that is certified by the Department of Homeland Security. Id. Accordingly, MGM
argued that because it employed Contemporary Services Corporation for the music festival,
MGM is granted protection under the 2002 Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies (SAFETY) Act, which limits a company's liability in claims that follow a terror
attack, so long as that company used services certified by Homeland Security. Id. MGM's
spokesperson argued that the Department of Justice's Crime Victims' Fund, which has more
than $12 billion dollars in funding, should award money to the victims of the Las Vegas
Massacre, as it did for victims of the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013. Elliott Mest, Why
MGM Resorts Wants Its Day in Federal Court, HOTEL MGMT. (Sept. 5, 2018, 5:53 PM),
https://www.hotelmanagement.net/legal/why-mgm-resorts-wants-its-day-federal-court.
However, the Las Vegas Massacre has yet to be ruled as an act of terrorism. Id. In fact, Jim
Connors, attorney at law firm Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, said that "the
act is notoriously vague in determining what is in fact a terrorist act," but he noted that
federal court is the best place to settle cases like these for both the plaintiffs and defendants
because of discrepancies surrounding what is awarded to the victims of such events based on
various state laws. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Police officers follow a man into a backyard and order him to show
his hands. One officer shouts, "gun, gun, gun, gun!" and the officers
fire twenty times, killing the man.1 When officers search for a gun,
only a cellphone is found.2 A police officer sprints up a staircase
where two frantic women hand him an infant, explaining that she
is not breathing.3 The police officer quickly begins performing com-
pressions until crying is heard.4 Later at a press conference, the
child's family thanks the officer and tells the crowd, "See, some-
times angels don't come from heaven."5 A police officer pulls up to
* Bridget M. Synan is a 2019 J.D. candidate at Duquesne University School of Law.
She graduated summa cum laude from Saint Vincent College in 2016 with a B.A. in English
and a second degree in politics. The author would like to thank Professor John Rago for his
guidance and support.
1. Jose A. Del Real, 20 Shots in Sacramento: Stephon Clark Killing Reignites a Furor,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/us/sacramento-stephon-
clark.html.
2. Id.





a home in the midst of gunfire.6 He finds a woman lying in the
driveway.7 As the woman's husband continues to fire, the officer
drags the woman to safety then returns to lead her two children out
of the home.8 Cell phone video shows a young man running from
police fall to the ground as shots ring out.9 Cell phone video shows
a young man playing basketball with a police officer on his break.10
Footage of police-citizen encounters, captured by officers and cit-
izens alike, increasingly allows the public to view the range of situ-
ations police officers respond to while performing their duties, thus
revealing the good, the bad, and the ugly of police work. Body-worn
camera footage often elicits strong emotions in the viewer, and in
many cases public outcry. Yet, a sharp disconnect exists between
public perception of use of force11 incidents and the Constitutional
limits of police authority.12 This disconnect often leads to situations
where the public expects an indictment based on a publicly released
video, yet a grand jury fails to return one.13 In turn, this leads to
further pain, confusion, and public outcry.14
In this article, I will argue that rather than the panacea hoped
for, police body cameras are merely an evidence collecting tool.
With regards to claims against police officers, body-worn camera
footage can be greatly beneficial in determining whether the officer
exercised excessive use of force. However, such an evaluation can
only properly be made when a jury is presented with all of the rel-
evant evidence and instructed on the applicable law. As police de-
partments increasingly outfit their officers with body-worn cam-
eras, the public must come to recognize the limitations of the de-
vices as well as the scope of police power. In order to facilitate this




9. Amy B. Wang & Alex Horton, Officer Who Shot and Killed Antwon Rose is Charged
with Criminal Homicide, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/06/27/east-pittsburgh-police-officer-who-shot-and-
killed-antwon-rose-charged-with-criminal-homicide/?utm term=.c49f704e4 16d.
10. Basketball 'Mystery Cop' Goes One-On-One with Kid in San Antonio, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 21, 2014, 5:02 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/basketball-mystery-
cop-n_5005273.html.
11. "Use of force" is defined as "the amount of effort required by police to compel compli-
ance by an unwilling subject." Philip Bulman, What Is Use of Force, and What Is a Use-of-
Force Continuum?, NAT'L INST. JUST. (Mar. 3, 2011), https://www.nij.gov/journals/267/
pages/use-of-force-what-is.aspx.
12. Tracey L. Meares et al., Lawful or Fair? How Cops and Laypeople Perceive Good Po-
licing, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 297, 300 (2015).
13. Caren Myers Morrison, Body Camera Obscura: The Semiotics of Police Video, 54 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 791, 793 (2017).
14. See id.
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process, state governments and police departments must hape pol-
icy so as to guide police discretion when using the cameras and to
ensure that the privacy of those featured in the video is preserved.
Accordingly, Section II discusses policing and camera technology
beginning with a focus on police officers' exercise of discretion.
Next, Section III describes the initial call to outfit police officers
with body-worn cameras following the 2014 unrest in Ferguson,
Missouri and the perceived benefits of body-worn cameras in pro-
moting accountability. A comparison will then be drawn between
the implementation of body-worn cameras to that of dashboard, or
in-car, cameras. I next call into question the overall reliability of
video evidence. After that, I discuss the tension between protecting
the privacy of individuals featured in body-worn camera footage
and the desire of the public for increased police oversight. I will
specifically explain the significance of this distinction in the context
of domestic violence situations. Finally, Section IV highlights
Pennsylvania's approach to a body-worn camera program and rec-
ommends that Pennsylvania's legislation serves as a model for
other states. This is so because it emphasizes evidence collection
and the preservation of the rights of parties seen in body-worn cam-
era footage over public transparency, while still allowing officials to
release body-worn camera footage when it is deemed appropriate to
do so.
II. POLICING AND CAMERA TECHNOLOGY
A. The Exercise of Discretion
The criminal justice system in the United States provides for the
exercise of discretion by police and prosecutors.15 Police officers
hold the power to decide "when and how to enforce the law."16 The
classic example of discretion involves speeding drivers.17 If the
speed limit is seventy miles per hour, and the officer clocks a vehicle
driving by at seventy-one, or even seventy-five, the officer is un-
likely to pull over the motorist even though the motorist clearly
broke the law. In contrast, it is much more likely that a police of-
ficer will pull over a motorist traveling at eighty-five miles per hour
15. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1243-44
(2011).
16. Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use,
Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89
MICH. L. REV. 442, 444-45 (1990).
17. George C. Thomas, III, Discretion and Criminal Law: The Good, the Bad, and the
Mundane, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2005).
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or higher. The decision to allow the driver speeding at seventy-five
miles per hour to continue traveling, but to pull over and ticket the
driver speeding at eighty-five miles per hour falls within a police
officer's discretion. Motorists expect the law to be enforced this
way. It is not feasible or desirable for the law to be enforced abso-
lutely, thus police officers must be granted discretion:
Given the limitations of law enforcement resources, the need
to prioritize policing goals, and the impossibility of legislating
every move that a police officer might make, society has little
choice but to entrust the police with a certain amount of discre-
tionary authority. Police discretion involves the power to
choose between two or more courses of conduct in a particular
set of circumstances. Because legislators cannot anticipate the
range of situations that police may face, they often draft crim-
inal laws of broad scope, leaving room for police to exercise dis-
cretion regarding the enforcement of these laws.
18
As legal scholar Roger A. Fairfax, Jr. explains, "Discretion per-
vades the American criminal justice system ... it is essential to the
efficient operation of the criminal justice system. Full enforcement
of the law would not only be impractical, but also unwise."19 On the
other hand, complete discretion would lead to arbitrary or improper
enforcement of the law.20 When a police officer does make an arrest,
it next comes within the discretion of the prosecutor to decide
whether to charge the offender.21 Thus, it is necessary to allow po-
lice and prosecutors to exercise a certain level of discretion in order
to provide fairness by choosing not to enforce the law in certain sit-
uations.22 The need for discretion in enforcing the law remains
when a police officer dons a body-worn camera. Many advocates of
body-worn cameras view the devices as a way to limit police officers'
discretion; however, to preserve the rights of citizens, the devices
will necessarily require police officers to make another discretion-
18. Reenah L. Kim, Note, Legitimizing Community Consent o Local Policing: The Need
for Democratically Negotiated Community Representation on Civilian Advisory Councils, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 463-64 (2001); see also Gregory Howard Williams, Police Dis-
cretion: The Institutional Dilemma - Who is in Charge?, 68 IOWA L. REV. 431, 432 (1983) ("As
a practical matter ... the police could not arrest all violators even if they so desired. Lack of
sufficient resources precludes such action. Consequently, the police exercise discretion, and
the public expects them to do so.").
19. Fairfax, supra note 15, at 1243-44.
20. Id. at 1250-51.
21. Id. at 1244 ("Prosecutors are expected to make decisions regarding which cases will
be prosecuted out of the many which could be prosecuted.").
22. Id. at 1243-44.
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ary decision-when to turn the cameras on and off. Therefore, dis-
cretion remains an integral and necessary part of policing in the
criminal justice system that body-worn cameras will not and cannot
eliminate.23 Rather, when implementing body-worn cameras, police
departments should focus on defining parameters for the exercise
of discretion as it applies to using the devices.
B. The Call for Body-Worn Cameras
Following the unrest in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014, the notion of
equipping officers with body-worn cameras emerged as a policy sug-
gestion.24 On August 9, 2014, white police officer Darren Wilson
fatally shot Michael Brown, an unarmed African-American teen-
ager.25 The shooting led to weeks of protests and rioting, which po-
lice responded to forcefully.26 Without a clear picture of what tran-
spired between Wilson and Brown, commenters began to suggest
that "[i]f Ferguson officers had such [body-worn] cameras . . . we
would know whether the Brown shooting was justified, and we
would know whether Ferguson police overreacted to peaceful, con-
stitutionally protected demonstrations or whether members of the
public were engaged in violent rioting warranting forceful police re-
sponse."27 In other words, commenters felt video documentation of
the incident would not only reveal whether the shooting itself was
justified, but whether public and police response in the aftermath
of the shooting was justified as well. Ultimately, supporters began
to promote body cameras as a comprehensive solution, which could
prevent "another Ferguson.'
28
The call to equip police officers with body-worn cameras received
support from a variety of stakeholders, including police chiefs, the
American Civil Liberties Union,29 and President Barack Obama.30
Some polls found nearly ninety percent of Americans, including
both Democrats and Republicans, supported the movement to equip
23. See generally Thomas, supra note 17, at 1043 ("Discretion in enforcement and prose-
cution of crime is inevitable; it can be restrained at the margin but it cannot be eliminated.").
24. Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831,
832 (2015).
25. Id. at 831; see also, e.g., Josh Voorhees, Everything That's Going Wrong in Ferguson,
SLATE (Nov. 25, 2014, 2:48 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/11/ferguson-police-
mistakes-documenting-the-police-response-to -the -latest-round-of-michaelbrown-protests
html.
26. Wasserman, supra note 24, at 831.
27. Id. at 832.
28. Id. at 833.
29. Morrison, supra note 13, at 791-92.




police officers with body-worn cameras.31 In May 2015, the Justice
Department announced a twenty million dollar grant for a body-
worn camera pilot program.32 As of February 2018, five states re-
quire at least some officers to wear body cameras.33 Body-worn
cameras offer a plethora of potential benefits to both police officers
and citizens by creating a reviewable record, providing a civilizing
effect, and aiding in the collection of evidence.
34
Many proponents of body-worn cameras, including those within
law enforcement, consider accountability as the primary benefit of
body-worn cameras.35 If an incident occurs while a police officer is
wearing a body camera, and the camera is turned on, then a review-
able record exists that can be used to evaluate the officer's actions.
Given the proliferation of cell phone cameras, bystanders will often
record encounters between police officers and citizens.36 By wear-
ing a camera, the officer can show his or her view of the incident.3
7
As Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division
of the U.S. Department of Justice, Roy L. Austin, Jr. explains,
"Some police departments are doing themselves a disservice by not
using body-worn cameras. Everyone around you is going to have a
camera, and so everyone else is going to be able to tell the story
better than you if you don't have these cameras."38 Thus, body-worn
31. German Lopez, The Failure of Police Body Cameras, VOX (July 21, 2017, 10:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/7/21/15983842/police-body-cameras-failures;
Peter Moore, Overwhelming Support for Police Body Cameras, YOUGOV (May 7, 2015, 3:21
PM), https://today.yougov.com/news/2015/05/07/body-cams/.
32. Justice Department Announces $20 Million in Funding to Support Body-Worn Cam-
era Pilot Program, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (May 1, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-de-
partment-announces-20-million-funding-support-body-worn-camera-pilot-program.
33. Body Worn Camera Laws Database: Requirements to Wear Body Cameras, NAT'L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 28, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/body-worn-cameras-interactive-graphic.aspx#/. "South Carolina's law requires, con-
tingent on state funding, that every police department implement a body camera program.
In Nevada and California, their laws require certain members of their state highway patrol
to wear body cameras. Connecticut's law requires their division of state police and special
police forces, as well as, municipal police officers receiving grant funds to wear body cameras
while interacting with the public." Id.
34. See generally LINDSAY MILLER ET AL., OFFICE CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S.
DEP'T JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND
LESSONS LEARNED 9 (2014).
35. See, e.g., Chris Dunn & Donna Lieberman, Body Cameras are Key for Police Account-
ability. We Can't Let Them Erode Privacy Rights., WASH. POST (June 1, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/06/01/bodycams-are-key-for-po-
lice-accountability-we-cant-let-them-erode-privacy-rights/?utm-term=. 470702e008bf
("Video's power to improve policing lies in the fact it makes us all eyewitness to police-civilian
interactions"); Maya Wiley, Body Cameras Help Everyone - Including the Police, TIME (May
9, 2017), http://time.com/4771417/jordan-edwards-body-cameras-police.
36. MILLER ETAL., supra note 34, at 1.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 9.
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cameras provide officers with a way to document their view of an
encounter, which is the pertinent view if a complaint later arises.
3 9
On the front end, footage can be an especially useful tool for
providing scenario-based training to new officers.40 Later, depart-
ments can use footage to evaluate performance as new officers enter
the field.41 Reviewing body-worn camera footage enables police de-
partments to identify both structural and individual issues regard-
ing officer conduct.4 2 Departments can then provide officers with
training to correct questionable behavior before it escalates, or ter-
minate officers if necessary.43 When addressing department-wide
claims, such as racial-profiling, body camera footage can provide a
record of whether profiling occurred and the frequency of such inci-
dents, and can show whether any patterns of behavior exist.44
Use of body-worn cameras demonstrably reduces use of force com-
plaints, and in many cases the footage exonerates the officer.4 5 A
2012 study of the Rialto, California Police Department found a 60%
reduction in use of force incidents after officers began wearing cam-
eras.46 The study randomly assigned body-worn cameras to police
officers, and found "shifts without cameras experienced twice as
many use of force incidents as shifts with cameras.'4 7 Likewise, a
2012 study conducted in Mesa, Arizona found officers that did not
wear body-cameras received "almost three times as many com-
plaints as the officers who wore the cameras."48 The Chief of Police
of Rialto, William Farrar, surmised that the reduction in com-
plaints likely occurred because both officers and citizens behaved
better knowing their actions were being filmed.4 9 In other words,
the body cameras provided a civilizing effect. Decades of research
demonstrating the presence of cameras, other people, or "even just
a picture of eyes," support Chief Farrar's observation.
50
Mere awareness of being watched tends "to nudge us toward ci-
vility: [w]e become more likely to give to charity, for example, and
39. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) ("The 'reasonableness' of a particular
use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene .
40. MILLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 7.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 7-8.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 8.
45. Id. at 6-7.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Amanda Ripley, A Big Test of Police Body Cameras Defies Expectations, N.Y. TIMES




less likely to speed, steal or take more than our fair share of
candy."51 However, a more recent study conducted in Washington,
D.C. showed no difference in the number of use of force incidents
between officers with and without body cameras.52 Explanations
for the surprising findings of the study, which contradicts the pop-
ularly held notion that cameras do provide a civilizing effect, in-
clude: (1) the possibility police officers became accustomed to the
cameras and hence desensitized to them; (2) "officers without cam-
eras were acting like officers with cameras, simply because they
knew other officers had the devices"; (3) in high-stress encounters
officers did not remember to activate their cameras; or (4) the cam-
eras were less effective in Washington, D.C. than in other cities be-
cause the department already addressed excessive use of force prob-
lems in the late 1990s.53
When determining whether an officer used excessive force,
54
courts use the Fourth Amendment reasonableness tandard.55 The
inquiry is an objective one that accounts for "the facts and circum-
stances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime
at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether [the suspect] is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." 56 In Gra-
ham v. Connor, the United States Supreme Court further notes,
"[n]ot every push or shove"'57 constitutes a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation; rather, "[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allow-
ance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a






54. "Excessive force" is defined as "[m]uch more force than is required to achieve a lawful
goal." Stephen Michael Sheppard, Excessive Force, WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW
DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012). The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police defines excessive force as "the
use of force which exceeds the level that a reasonable officer might reasonably believe, at the
time of the incident, is necessary under the circumstances of a particular incident."
PITTSBURGH BUREAU OF POLICE, USE OF FORCE 2 (May 19, 2015), http://apps.pittsburghpa.
gov/redtail/images/1 147 12-06 Use of Force.pdf.
55. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382-83 (2007); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989).
56. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
57. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
58. Id. at 396-97.
59. Scott, 550 U.S. at 383 (stating "we must still slosh our way through the factbound
morass of 'reasonableness").
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Proponents of body-worn cameras believe video will resolve fac-
tual disputes between a police officer and a suspect's version of
events by providing an objective account of the incident.60 The rea-
sonableness tandard under the Fourth Amendment, however, di-
verges from what most people consider acceptable behavior.6 1 Stud-
ies show a wide disparity in what the public considers legitimate
police conduct and what police conduct is constitutionally permissi-
ble.6 2 For example, pursuant to department policy in Pittsburgh, a
police officer may use a level of force that exceeds that used by the
suspect.6 3 Most police departments have established a use of force
continuum describing a series of escalating actions an officer may
take.6 4 Hence, video that clearly seems to show excessive force
when viewed by the public will oftentimes fail to lead to an indict-
ment when presented to a grand jury that has taken into account
the circumstances leading up to the incident.6 5 Moreover, video is
subject to the bias of the factfinder.
66
C. Lessons Learned from Dashboard Camera
The policy arguments over body-worn cameras are not unfamil-
iar. Two decades ago, police departments and activists similarly
debated the costs and benefits of another type of video surveillance:
in-car dashboard cameras.6 7 Initially, dashboard cameras were in-
tended to aid in the prosecution of drunk drivers.68 In fact, insur-
ance companies funded the first wave of dashboard cameras in the
1980s.6 9 These companies ought to reduce the medical bills accom-
panying drunk driving incidents by increasing enforcement and
penalties imposed against drunk drivers.70 The then recently
60. Kami N. Chavis, Body-Worn Cameras: Exploring the Unintentional Consequences of
Technological Advances and Ensuring a Role for Community Consultation, 51 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 985, 992 (2016).
61. Morrison, supra note 13, at 792-93.
62. Id. at 793; see also Meares et al., supra note 12, at 300.
63. See, e.g., PITTSBURGH BUREAU OF POLICE, supra note 54, at 2 ("To gain control in a
physical confrontation, an officer may be required to use a force option which exceeds the
level of force employed by the subject, and an officer may do so, so long as the force option
utilized is reasonable under the circumstances.").
64. The Use-of-Force Continuum, NAT'L INST. JUST. (Aug. 4, 2009), https://www.nij.gov/
topics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/Pages/continuum.aspx.
65. Morrison, supra note 13, at 792-93.
66. Id. at 796.
67. Robinson Meyer, Seen It All Before: 10 Predictions About Police Body Cameras,







formed organization, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, also pro-
vided funds.71 Later, in the 1990s, the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration provided additional support for the purchase of cameras
in order to document whether a suspect gave consent to a vehicle
search, which is important evidence in the prosecution of drug traf-
fickers.72 Later on, activists began to view dashboard cameras as a
way to document and prevent racial profiling.73 In the late 1990s
and early 2000s, advocates argued dashboard cameras could pre-
vent racial profiling by making officers aware their actions were be-
ing recorded.
74
After initial skepticism, law enforcement agencies also came to
support use of dashboard cameras.75 With increased support came
more funding, and between 2000 and 2004, the Department of Jus-
tice gave twenty-one million dollars in grants to state and local
agencies for the purchase of dashboard cameras.76 Ultimately, the
grants outfitted police cruisers in forty-nine states and Washington,
D.C. with dashboard cameras.77 A study published by the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police ("IACP") in 2004, funded by
the Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services ("COPS"), evaluated the use and impact of dashboard cam-
era for forty-seven state agencies that received in-car camera
grants.78 The study surveyed the agencies as well as prosecutors
and the public.79 The study identified many of the same benefits
and concerns for implementing dashboard camera that analyses of
body-worn cameras discuss today. The survey found that in-car
camera reduced complaints regarding officer professionalism and
courtesy, and typically exonerated officers of any accusations of
wrongdoing.80 Only 5% of the over 3,000 officers surveyed reported
that complaints against them were sustained by video evidence.81
Dashboard camera improved both officer and citizen behavior.8 2 Of-








78. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF
VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN POLICING: RESEARCH AND BEST PRACTICES FROM THE IACP
STUDY ON IN-CAR CAMERAS 1 (William Albright et al. eds., 2005).
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id. at 15.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 23.
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rolling likewise reported that citizens behaved more courteously.83
This finding confirmed prior research indicating "the demeanor of
the police and public are interdependent."8 4  Furthermore, the
study found, "in-car camera enjoys overwhelming public support
and can enhance an agency's image while ensuring integrity and
accountability.
'8 5
Notably, the majority of officers surveyed regarded the dashboard
cameras primarily as a tool for gathering evidence.86 In a 1990 ar-
ticle, New York Times reporter Andrew Malcom interviewed the
heads of several law enforcement agencies regarding dashboard
camera.8 7 Franklin County Sheriffs Department Chief Deputy Mi-
chael E. Creamer admitted, "I was skeptical of the cameras at first
.... Now I'd like a camera in all 45 cars."8 8 Creamer went on to
explain how the substantial evidentiary value of the video led to his
support for dashboard cameras, pontificating: "We'll show the
judge, the jury and the courtroom how they really looked driving on
the wrong side, falling down by their car, unable to walk a straight
line or recite the alphabet. It's very hard to rebut that kind of tes-
timony. '8 9 While dashboard cameras led to a notable increase in
prosecutions for driving under the influence in Richmond, Virginia,
Captain Thomas Shook of Richmond's Traffic Safety Division was
careful to note, "[t]he cameras are no panacea ... some of the older
guys grumble about the extra gear and new technology. But our
guilty pleas are going up each month-and so are ... our requests
for alcohol treatment."90 The sentiments of Creamer and Shook
largely echo the initial skepticism with which law enforcement of-
ficers viewed body-worn cameras, along with later acceptance that
the devices do provide notable benefits, especially in terms of evi-
dence collection and prosecution.
On their part, prosecutors "rated the overall use of [dashboard]
video evidence as successful or highly successful."91 Prosecutors
found dashboard video especially useful in cases involving "driving
under the influence, traffic violations, vehicular pursuits, assaults
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 29.
86. Id. at 16.
87. Andrew H. Malcolm, Drunken Drivers Now Facing Themselves on Video Camera,





91. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 78, at 22.
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on officers, narcotics enforcement, domestic violence, and civil liti-
gation against law enforcement agencies."92 The prosecutors sur-
veyed did report concerns regarding the limited field of vision of the
cameras and poor audio/video quality.93 The study also noted stor-
age of the video evidence would be one of the biggest obstacles for
an agency implementing dashboard cameras to overcome.94 These
concerns largely echo those mentioned in the debate over body-worn
cameras heard today.
Ultimately, the IACP study advised, "the recordings should be
treated as any other evidentiary items" because dashboard camera
footage can serve as critical evidence in criminal, civil, or adminis-
trative matters.95 Today's dashboard cameras may offer even fur-
ther evidentiary value because modern technological additions can
provide information beyond the recording alone.96 For example,
some dashboard cameras are equipped to mark an area using
GPS.97 If a suspect is seen throwing an item out of their car during
pursuit, the officers can later return to the area to search for weap-
ons or drugs.98 Some dashboard cameras can also record when a
vehicle brakes, which would be important evidence if the vehicle
were in crash.99
Perhaps one of the most well-known pieces of dashboard camera
evidence is the video the United States Supreme Court relied on in
Scott v. Harris.10 0 In March 2001, police clocked Victor Harris trav-
eling at seventy-three miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour
speed zone.10 1 Harris did not pull over when a Georgia County dep-
uty activated his lights; rather, he engaged in a chase down mostly
two-lane roads at speeds exceeding eighty-five miles per hour.
10 2
Deputy Timothy Scott joined the pursuit, becoming the lead car af-
ter Harris pulled into a shopping center.1 03 Police nearly boxed Har-
ris in at the shopping center, but he managed to exit the lot and
speed away once more.10 4 After receiving permission from his su-
pervisor to "take him out," Scott "applied his push bumper to the
92. Id.
93. Id. at 21-22.
94. Id. at 36.
95. Id.




100. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
101. Id. at 374.
102. Id. at 374-75.
103. Id. at 375.
104. Id.
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rear" of the vehicle, which caused Harris to lose control.10 5 Harris'
vehicle "left the roadway, ran down an embankment, overturned,
and crashed."
106
The severe injuries Harris sustained in the crash left him a quad-
riplegic.10 7 Harris filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,108 arguing his
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure were vio-
lated by Scott's use of deadly force.10 9 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found Harris "remained in control
of his vehicle," slowing for turns and using his indicators, and did
not pose a threat to pedestrians.110 Consequently, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit ruled that "a jury could conclude that Scott unreasonably used
deadly force to seize Harris by ramming him off the road." '111 The
case ultimately made it to the United States Supreme Court, which
decided the video evidence clearly contradicted Harris' version of
the story, and that the facts should be viewed "in the light depicted
by the videotape.' 112 Upon watching the video, the Supreme Court
declared:
Far from being the cautious and controlled driver the lower
court depicts, what we see on the video more closely resembles
a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort, plac-
ing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk
of serious injury .... Respondent's version of events is so ut-
terly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could
have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have re-
lied on such visible fiction. 113
The majority considered the video irrefutable. The Court even




108. Section 1983 claims provide "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity." 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
109. Scott, 550 U.S. at 375-76.
110. Harris v. Coweta Cty., 433 F.3d 807, 815-16 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Scott, 550 U.S.
at 378-79 (writing for the majority Justice Scalia notes, "reading the lower court's opinion,
one gets the impression that respondent, rather than fleeing from police, was attempting to
pass his driving test").
111. Harris, 433 F.3d at 821.




the videotape to speak for itself."1 1 4 Justice Stevens, however, saw
the tape as confirming the lower court's view of the facts.
115
Justice Stevens believed the other cars seen pulling to the side of
the road did so not because Harris forced them off the road, but
because of the sirens and lights of the police cars.116 According to
Justice Stevens, a reasonable jury could find the motorists were at
no greater risk than if a speeding ambulance drove past.117 No pe-
destrians or residences were visible during the chase, Justice Ste-
vens noted, and at one point Harris even slowed down to wait for
cars moving in the other direction to pass.11 8 Concluding, Stevens
emphasized, "[i]f two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently
about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding
that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could
disagree with this Court's characterization of events."119 Although
he was the lone dissenter, "[i]n reporting that he, at least, saw
something different, Justice Stevens was plainly advancing the
claim that the tape doesn't speak for itself-that different people,
with different experiences, can see different things in it.
'
120
A group of law professors decided to take on the so-called "Scott
Challenge" of letting the video "speak for itself' by showing the
video to approximately 1,350 individuals.12 1 Although the bulk of
subjects agreed with the majority's view of the videotape, "marked
differences in perceptions" were identifiable across certain sub-
groups.122 Approximately 75% of participants in the study agreed
with the majority, while 25% did not agree that use of deadly force
was justified.123 African Americans were significantly more pro-
plaintiff, as were lower-income subjects.124 "[B]eing African Amer-
ican (as opposed to white)" had the largest effect on response
measures.
125
The test showed life experience influences perception of a suppos-
edly completely objective video and can lead reasonable people to
disparate conclusions.12 The study found "[d]ifferences in means
114. Id. at 378 n.5.
115. Id. at 390 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 390-91.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 392-93.
119. Id. at 396.
120. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?: Scott v. Harris and the
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 848 (2009).
121. Id. at 848, 854.
122. Id. at 864.
123. Id. at 866.
124. Id. at 867.
125. Id.
126. See generally id.
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show that characteristics like race, gender, income, party affilia-
tion, ideology, region of residence, and cultural orientation all tend
to matter" when viewing the video.127 The study identified two dis-
tinct cultural styles:
Individuals (particularly white males) who hold hierarchical
and individualist cultural worldviews, who are politically con-
servative, who are affluent, and who reside in the West were
likely to form significantly more pro-defendant risk percep-
tions. Individuals who hold egalitarian and communitarian
views, whose politics are liberal, who are well educated but
likely less affluent, and whose ranks include disproportion-
ately more African Americans and women, in contrast, were
significantly more likely to form pro-plaintiff views and to re-
ject the conclusion that the police acted reasonably in using
deadly force to terminate the chase.
128
Consequently, the Court's decision in Scott v. Harris can only be
justified if the group of people who see the video differently from
the majority are unreasonable.129 The divergent reactions to a
seemingly straightforward piece of evidence demonstrate that video
is not necessarily a silent and impartial witness. Rather, the mean-
ing one derives from watching video evidence is greatly impacted
by one's own views and experiences.130
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN PRIVACY AND TRANSPARENCY
A. Privacy Concerns
Privacy is a major concern when implementing a body-worn cam-
era program. When wearing a body camera, a police officer may
encounter suspects, victims, and bystanders in a variety of stressful
and extreme circumstances.13 1 The need to protect the privacy of
individual citizens clearly stands in tension with the desire for in-
creased transparency.13 2 Footage will often depict citizens who may
not want their images widely shared; especially if police captured
127. Id. at 870.
128. Id. at 879.
129. Id. at 880-81.
130. Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 947-48 (2017).
131. JAY STANLEY, ACLU, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN
PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL 2 (2015).
132. Developments in the Law -Policing: Chapter Four: Considering Police Body Cameras,
128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1808 (2015).
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the video during a sensitive situation.133 Video may also serve no
legitimate public purpose other than embarrassment.13 4 For exam-
ple, dashboard camera footage of intoxicated individuals often goes
viral, and becomes immortalized online.135 Of particular concern is
when an officer responds to a domestic violence call at a private
residence.136 Legal scholar Mary D. Fan posits the following sce-
nario:
You call the police to report stalking by an ex-partner. Officers
come to your home to take your statement. You reveal personal
details about your relationship, your employment, your nightly
fear, how you sought a protection order. All of this infor-
mation-plus your address and intimate details inside your
home-are recorded on police body camera by the responding
officers. This video of you ends up posted on YouTube, obtained
pursuant to a sweeping public disclosure request for all police
body camera video by someone you have never met.
137
The need to protect privacy in a domestic violence situation is
abundantly clear. In many cities, domestic violence calls account
for the largest number of emergency calls138 and pose great danger
to responding officers with "22% of law enforcement officer 'line of
duty' deaths" between 2010 and 2014 occurring "while responding
to a call for service involving a domestic dispute."13 9 Additionally,
prosecutors often find it particularly difficult to try domestic vio-
lence cases.140 Victims habitually fail to cooperate for a variety of
133. STANLEY, supra note 131, at 5.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Bryce Clayton Newell, Collateral Visibility: A Socio-Legal Study ofPolice Body-Cam-
era Adoption, Privacy, and Public Disclosure in Washington State, 92 IND. L.J. 1329, 1337
(2017) ("[A]s police officers are outfitted with mobile surveillance devices, such as body-
worn cameras, which are not constrained by property or spatial limitations (that is, they can
be worn into private residences or anywhere else the officer chooses to be), the tensions be-
tween privacy, state surveillance, and public access become increasingly escalated.").
137. Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA.
L. REV. 395, 397 (2016).
138. How Police Are Trained to Respond to Domestic Violence, DOMESTIC SHELTERS (May
4, 2016), https://www.domesticshelters.org/domestic-violence-articles-information/how-po-
lice-are-trained-to-respond-to-domestic-violence#.WlubXzsddp8.
139. Law Enforcement, Justice System and Domestic Violence, DOMESTIC SHELTERS (Jan.
7, 2015), https://www.domesticshelters.org/resources/statistics/law-enforcement-and-domes-
tic-violence#.Vq-n 7SorLIU.
140. See, e.g., CAROLYN C. HARTLEY & ROXANN RYAN, NAT'L INST. JUSTICE, PROSECUTION
STRATEGIES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FELONIES: TELLING THE STORY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
1 (April 2002); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domes-
tic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1860-62 (1996); Thomas L. Kirsch II, Prob-
lems in Domestic Violence: Should Victims be Forced to Participate in the Prosecution of their
Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 383, 425-26 (2001).
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reasons, such as: fear of retaliation, financial dependence on the
abuser, or because the victim yields "to their abusers' need for
power and control."141 As such, it is imperative for police officers to
collect as much evidence as possible when initially responding to a
domestic violence call. Thus, if the victim no longer wishes to coop-
erate in the prosecution, proof remains that can corroborate the in-
itial allegations and sustain the conviction.142 Hence, in addressing
domestic violence, use of body-worn cameras can be greatly benefi-
cial to officers, prosecutors, and victims.
Body-worn camera footage "can provide prosecutors with power-
ful evidence of the actions and statements of offenders and victims
and the scene of the incident, in ways that written descriptions or
still photographs cannot equate."143 In fact, in a study conducted in
Phoenix, Arizona, researchers found domestic violence cases involv-
ing a camera-wearing officer "were more likely to be initiated by the
prosecutor's office (40.9% vs. 34.3%), have charges filed (37.7% vs.
26%), have cases furthered (12.7% vs. 6.2%), result in a guilty plea




The benefits of body-worn camera footage in the context of do-
mestic violence are clear; yet, individuals hold a constitutionally
recognized right to greater privacy in the home than in public.
145
This is one area where implementation of a body-worn camera pro-
gram differs from the implementation of dashboard camera.
Whereas dashboard camera generally captures content occurring
on public roads and highways, body cameras can invade the private
sphere. Thus, state legislatures and police departments must care-
fully craft body camera policies that strike a balance between the
need to protect the privacy of individuals, and victims especially,
while reaping the benefits of evidence collected by body-worn cam-
era. The need to preserve privacy, though, also stands in tension
141. Farrah Champagne, Prosecuting Domestic Violence Cases, Am. B. ASS'N (Sept. 17,
2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/criminal/articles/2015/fall
2015-09 15-prosecuting-domestic-violence-cases/.
142. Paula Reed Ward, Why Do some Victims of Domestic Violence Refuse to Testify?, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE (June 23, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.post-gazette.com/local/region/
2013/06/23/Why-do-some-victims-of-domestic-violence-refuse-to-testify/stories/2013062301
45.
143. SANDRA TIBBETTS MURPHY, BATTERED WOMEN'S JUSTICE PROJECT, POLICE BODY
CAMERAS IN DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL ASSAULT INVESTIGATIONS: CONSIDERATIONS AND
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 8 (2015).
144. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, BODY-WORN CAMERA
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 11 (2007), https://www.bja. govlbwc/pdfslbwc-faqs.pdf.
145. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 647-48 (1961); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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with public desire for increased transparency and the idea that
body cameras would facilitate greater citizen oversight of the police.
One way to address privacy concerns is to require a police officer
to give notification that he or she is recording via body camera upon
entering a private residence. It may not always be feasible, how-
ever, to safely give notification based upon the circumstances when
police officers arrive. The ACLU therefore recommends police offic-
ers give notice except in an emergency situation.146 Most police de-
partments allow officers the discretion not to record if "doing so
would be unsafe, impossible, or impractical.' 147 Departments cur-
rently using body-worn cameras employ a variety of notification pol-
icies. Some departments require police officers to give notification
when recording; some only encourage it, while others do not specify
whether or not notification is required.148 For example, in Los An-
geles, notice is "encouraged but not required if officers are legally
in the area.'149 In Minneapolis, notice is "[e]ncouraged in general.
If asked, an officer must inform those inquiring that [the] body
cam[era] is recording, unless it would be unsafe to do so.'
15°
Whereas in Tampa, officers must only give notification when re-
cording victims. 151 Meanwhile, in San Antonio officers "are not re-
quired to advise citizens they are being recorded or show any citizen
a video which they recorded" and officers need not activate or deac-
tivate a body-worn camera based "solely upon the request of a citi-
zen."152 Due to the increased privacy concerns when interviewing
victims, some departments prefer to give officers discretion in de-
termining whether or not to record these interviews.153 The ACLU
advises body-worn camera policies should not require continuous
recording for the duration of the police officer's shift, or even during
every public encounter.154 Originally, the ACLU advocated for an
all-public-encounters policy; however, it changed its position upon
consideration of the importance of protecting the privacy rights of
victims and witnesses, especially in states where open-records laws
146. STANLEY, supra note 131, at 6.
147. MILLER ETAL., supra note 34, at 13.
148. Police Body Camera Policies: Recording Circumstances, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.





152. SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEPT. GENERAL MANUAL, PROCEDURE 410 - BODY WORN
CAMERAS 2 (2017).
153. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 18.
154. STANLEY, supra note 131, at 4.
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do not protect access to routine footage.155 Consequently, the ACLU
suggests the decision to record should be within an officer's control;
although, the officer's ability to choose which encounters to record
should be limited.
156
Recording can also impinge upon the privacy of the officer. The
ACLU has acknowledged, "continuous recording might feel as
stressful and oppressive in those situations as it would for any em-
ployee subject to constant recording by their supervisor."157 This
could create distrust between officers and their supervisors.
158
Many police officers feel concern over adding more scrutiny to an
already stressful job.159 First-level officers in particular feel pres-
sure to "get everything right."160 The danger also exists that footage
could be misused by supervisors to discipline officers for minor vio-
lations, particularly in the case of whistleblowers or union activ-
ists.161 Moreover, not every action an officer takes during a shift
will involve a police-citizen encounter. For example, during a shift,
an officer may answer a phone call from a spouse, pick up lunch, or
chat with other officers about football, precinct politics, or any num-
ber of topics not related to work.
Other initiatives aimed at increasing public trust of police, such
as community policing,16 2 could suffer if departments required po-
lice officers to record all public encounters.163 The philosophy of
community policing encourages police departments to develop col-
laborative partnerships with "the individuals and organizations
they serve to develop solutions to problems and increase trust in
police. '16 4 In other words, it encourages interaction and communi-
cation between officers and members of the community. One facet
of achieving this goal involves placing officers on long-term assign-
ments to specific neighborhoods in order to "enhance customer ser-
vice and facilitate more contact between police and citizens, thus
establishing a strong relationship and mutual accountability."
' 165
155. Id.
156. Id. at 4.
157. Id. at 3.
158. MILLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 24.
159. Id. at 24-25.
160. Id. at 25.
161. STANLEY, supra note 131, at 3.
162. Community policing is "a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that
support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively
address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social
disorder, and fear of crime." OFFICE CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE,
COMMUNITY POLICING DEFINED 1 (2012).
163. MILLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 12.
164. OFFICE CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 162.
165. Id. at 7.
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Neighborhood placements seek to promote familiarity and comfort
between police officers and citizens. Such efforts could suffer if
these "routine and casual situations-such as officers on foot or bike
patrol who wish to chat with neighborhood residents"-were re-
quired to be recorded, because "turning on a video camera could
make the encounter seem suspicious and off-putting."16 6 The Chief
of Police of Greensboro, North Carolina, Ken Miller, explained:
There are a lot of issues with recording every citizen contact
without regard to how cooperative or adversarial it is . . . if
people think that they are going to be recorded every time they
talk to an officer, regardless of the context, it is going to dam-
age openness and create barriers to important relationships.
16 7
Body camera footage can capture the wide array of situations a
police officer encounters, from chatting with a member of the com-
munity while walking the beat to responding to a tense emergency
situation in an individual's home. As discussed above, knowledge
that one is being recorded changes human behavior.168 While this
phenomenon creates a civilizing effect that benefits both police of-
ficers and citizens in most situations,16 9 there are certain encoun-
ters where the presence of a camera may cause discomfort and hin-
der the efforts of police officers to communicate with victims or build
trust in the community. As such, the proper use of body-worn cam-
eras necessitates policies which allow police officers to use discre-
tion in determining when and when not to record.
B. Body-Worn Camera Legislation in Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, legislators made major changes to state law in
order to successfully implement body-worn camera programs in po-
lice departments across the state.170 State Senator Stewart J.
Greenleaf originally introduced the legislation, known as Act 22,
remarking that "[t]he use of body-worn cameras not only ensures
the integrity of convictions by capturing the defendant's conduct at
166. MILLER ETAL., supra note 34, at 12.
167. Id. at 13.
168. Ripley, supra note 50.
169. MILLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 6.
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the scene, but the cameras also have ancillary benefits" such as in-
creasing guilty pleas while decreasing suppression hearings, ad-
ministrative complaints, and civil lawsuits against police officers.
171
In order to receive grant funding for a body-worn camera pro-
gram, police departments in Pennsylvania "must issue a written,
publicly accessible policy. ' 172 The policy must meet or exceed the
recommendations adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on
Crime and Delinquency ("PCCD"), which include: (1) establishing a
protocol "related to the implementation, use, maintenance or stor-
age of body worn cameras"; (2) making that protocol "publicly acces-
sible"; and (3) "[e]nsuring that the protocol . . . substantially
compl[ies] with applicable recommendations by the Commission."
173
For example, the Pennsylvania State Police's body-worn camera
policy outlines the goals of its program, the responsibilities of offic-
ers wearing the cameras, rules on when to record, and procedures
for reviewing and releasing video.174 The PCCD further encourages
police agencies to develop such policies "in accordance with best
practices [and] with input from . . . community stakeholders, such
as local victim service providers, community police review boards,
and other interested parties .
' 175
Initially, the use of body-worn cameras conflicted with Pennsyl-
vania's wiretap laws, which prohibited recording in private resi-
dences without the owner's consent.176 Consequently, a police of-
ficer faced potential felony charges if he or she entered a private
home while wearing a body camera.177 As mentioned previously,
body-worn cameras are especially useful when responding to do-
mestic violence calls due to both the danger posed to police officers
and the need to collect evidence.178 Pennsylvania Senator Green-
leaf, recognizing this issue, proposed legislation that would permit
officers to record in private residences 'ecause so much of their
171. Memorandum from Stewart J. Greenleaf to Senate (Dec. 12, 2016, 3:39 PM),
https://www.legis.state.pa.us//cfdocs/Legis/CSM/showMemoPublic.cfm?chamber=S&SPick=
20170&cosponld=21330.




174. See generally PA. STATE POLICE, BODY-WORN CAMERA EQUIPMENT 1-16 (2018),
https://www.psp.pa. gov/for20media/Documents/BWCo2OPolicy.pdf.
175. PA. COMM'N ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, supra note 172.
176. Finnerty, supra note 170; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5702 (2018) ("[a]ny oral com-
munication uttered by a person possessing an expectation that such communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.").
177. Id.
178. MURPHY, supra note 143, at 8.
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work involves responding to incidents taking place inside a resi-
dence. Measures can be taken to protect the privacy of the occu-
pants of the residence, and the recordings will enhance any prose-
cution of wrongdoers inside the residence."
179
In order to enable the use of body cameras in departments across
the state, Pennsylvania legislators eliminated the double consent
barrier by excluding communications made to police officers wear-
ing body cameras from Pennsylvania's Right-to-Know Law, while
simultaneously limiting the ability of the public to gain access to
such footage.180 Generally, under Pennsylvania's Right-to-Know
Law, public records are available unless an enumerated exemption
applies.181 Act 22 amended the definition of an "oral communica-
tion" so as to exclude communications "made in the presence of a
law enforcement officer on official duty who is . . . using an [ap-
proved] electronic ... device ... to intercept the communication in
the course of law enforcement duties" from state wiretap law.18 2 Ad-
ditionally, Act 22, "pre-empts the Right-to-Know Law, and estab-
lishes procedures for requests for law enforcement audio recordings
or video recordings from body cameras.183 As a result, most people
will not be able to access body camera footage through the state's
Right-to-Know law in order to protect the privacy of individuals ap-
pearing in body-worn camera footage.1 8 4 As Pennsylvania State Po-
lice Spokesman Ryan Tarkowski clarifies, "[t]his protects the pri-
vacy of anyone who might have day-to-day interaction with the po-
lice including people reporting crimes, victims, witnesses and by-
standers," though, "[v]ideo will still be available to parties with di-
rect involvement-like a pending court case-and be made public in
certain circumstances."'1 8 5 Accordingly, the footage will be easily
179. Memorandum from Stewart J. Greenleaf to Senate, supra note 171.
180. Body Worn Camera Laws Database: Requirements to Wear Body Cameras, supra note
33.
181. Id.; see also 65 P.S. § 67.305(a) stating:
A record in the possession of a Commonwealth agency or local agency shall be
presumed to be a public record. The presumption shall not apply if: (1) the rec-
ord is exempt under section 708; (2) the record is protected by a privilege; or
(3) the record is exempt from disclosure under any other Federal or State law or
regulation or judicial order or decree.
182. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5702.
183. Body Worn Camera Laws Database: Requirements to Wear Body Cameras, supra note
33.
184. Finnerty, supra note 170.
185. Id.
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accessible to those recorded, or reasonably related to someone rec-
orded,186 but not to the public at large.18 7 While this measure may
limit transparency, it ensures individual privacy. As Pennsylvania
State Senator Sharif Street, who represents areas of Philadelphia
County, explains:
In our effort to shine a light on truth and justice, we must be
sensitive to citizens' privacy. We live in an era of instant grat-
ification . . . thanks to social media . . . While it's awakened
society to important issues, it should not come at the expense
of allowing anyone to put individuals on public display without
their consent.
188
While many consider limited access as an important step in pro-
tecting privacy, others believe it undermines the potential for body-
worn cameras to facilitate greater public oversight of the police.
189
The Pennsylvania ACLU argued that creating a different process
for obtaining body camera video "turns the [Right-to-Know] pre-
sumption1 90 on its head."191 The ACLU objected to Pennsylvania's
legislation, "because it undermines public trust by creating a new,
confusing process for getting access to body cam[era] footage.'192 In
addressing the tension between promoting transparency and pro-
tecting an individual's constitutional right to privacy, Pennsylvania
legislators decided to strike the balance largely in favor of privacy.
As use of body-worn camera becomes more common, each state
must likewise determine the limitations it will place on the release
of footage.
Currently, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have
enacted legislation specifying separate procedures for requesting
body-camera footage under open records law and detailing which
footage can and cannot be released to the public.193 Connecticut,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas, include body camera
186. The mother of a child that has been recorded, for example.
187. Sharif Street, Body Camera Law Balances Right to Know vs. Right to Privacy, PHILA.




190. See 65 P.S. § 67.305 (creating the presumption that a record in the possession of a
Commonwealth or local agency is a public record).
191. Finnerty, supra note 170 (quoting Liz Randol, legislative director for the ACLU in
Pennsylvania).
192. Id.
193. Body Worn Camera Laws Database: Body-Worn Camera Data and Open Record




footage as a public record; however, these policies provide excep-
tions that allow police to deny access to the video-or otherwise re-
dact or obscure the footage-in certain situations.19 4 For example,
Connecticut law prohibits the disclosure of a "communication be-
tween police officers and undercover officers or informants, any
medical or psychological treatment and victims of domestic or sex-
ual abuse, homicide, suicide or accidental death.19 5 Under Texas
law, only footage used or potentially used as evidence in a criminal
proceeding is subject to the open records law; however, footage
taken in a private space or of an incident that constitutes a misde-
meanor not resulting in arrest may not be released.19 6 Conversely,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Oregon, and South Carolina exclude body-
worn camera footage from open records laws; yet these states pro-
vide exceptions that allow the public to access video in certain situ-
ations.19 7 Georgia law allows access to "those who believe the video
would be relevant to a pending criminal case or civil action.19 8 In
Florida and South Carolina, persons who are the subject of a body
camera recording may request he video.199 In Oregon body camera
footage may be released if it serves the public interest.
200
The approach taken by Pennsylvania and other states that have
established separate procedures for obtaining body camera footage
outside open records law is preferable to the patchwork of inclu-
sions and exclusions other states have carved out to address privacy
concerns. By either excluding certain footage from open records law
while providing for exceptions to enable access or by including body
camera footage under open records laws while providing exceptions
that deny access, these states create potential for confusion as to
what footage citizens may access. While crafting a different process
for obtaining body camera footage may seem counterintuitive to the
Right-to-Know presumption,20 1 body camera footage presents a
markedly greater potential to intrude upon the privacy of individu-
als than records20 2 conventionally thought of as accessible under
open records law requests.
194. Id.
195. Id.; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(b)(3) (2018).
196. Body Worn Camera Laws Database: Body-Worn Camera Data and Open Record
Laws, supra note 193; TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.661(f) (2017).
197. Body Worn Camera Laws Database: Body-Worn Camera Data and Open Record




201. See Finnerty, supra note 170.
202. Under 65 P.S. § 67.102, a record is defined as:
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While under Pennsylvania law a record includes a film or sound
recording that documents the activity of an agency, and body-worn
camera footage made by a police agency fits squarely within this
description, the extent to which police would begin recording their
activity could not have been envisioned when the latest version of
the Right-to-Know Law went into full effect in 2009.203 For exam-
ple, in a guide to the open records law, the ACLU of Pennsylvania
lists agency meeting minutes, the salaries of public officials, com-
munications between lobbyists and legislators, internal email, and
911 time response logs as examples of the type of records available
to the public under the state's Right-to Know law.20 4 Hence, those
participating in the creation of such records would have been at
least marginally aware of the public nature of the documents at the
time of their creation. For example, when running for office, a leg-
islator knows he or she will be subject to public scrutiny; or, when
placing a call to 911 citizens use a public service. As such there is
a decreased expectation of privacy. In contrast, citizens may not
know whether a police officer's body-worn camera is turned on and
recording their actions. Furthermore, footage taken on body cam-
eras is far likelier to capture people in compromising, emotional, or
intimate settings as compared to the mere release of email or a 911
time log.20 5 Thus, while body camera footage may technically fit
within open records law because it is created by a government
agency, there is elevated potential that such footage will infringe
upon the privacy rights of individuals who do not expect that rec-
ords of their activity will be available and subject to public scrutiny.
Consequently, access to body camera footage should not be openly
obtainable through open records law and creating a separate proce-
dure to protect the rights and privacy of those involved is fitting and
proper.
Citizens seeking to obtain footage in the possession of a Pennsyl-
vania police agency must submit a detailed request20 to that
Information, regardless of physical form or characteristics, that documents a
transaction or activity of an agency and that is created, received or retained
pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction, business or activity of the
agency. The term includes a document, paper, letter, map, book, tape, photo-
graph, film or sound recording, information stored or maintained electronically
and a data-processed or image-processed document.
203. 65 P.S. § 67.3104.
204. AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION PA., A GUIDE TO OPEN RECORDS LAWS IN PENNSYLVANIA
(n.d.), https://www.aclupa.org/files/1013/7960/5287/Open-Records-Pamphlet-9-13.pdf.
205. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 137.
206. The request must include "[t]he date, time and location of the event recorded," '[a]
statement describing the requester's relationship to the event recorded," and "[i]f the rec-
orded incident took place inside a residence, the request must also identify every person pre-
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agency's open records officer or "if the agency has a memorandum
of understanding with either a District Attorney's Office or the At-
torney General's Office, an attorney from one of those offices may
review the request and decide if the recording will be released."
20 7
For example, release of video recorded by the Pennsylvania State
Police is "coordinated with the applicable district attorney's of-
fice. '20 8 In order to comply with ethical rules governing prosecutors,
"[t]he public release of body-worn camera recordings in active crim-
inal prosecutions is limited ... in order to avoid potentially tainting
the jury pool or violating other rights of a criminal defendant ...
[and] to avoid possible problems in ensuring a fair trial."209 Conse-
quently, if the requested recording contains "[p]otential evidence in
a criminal matter; or" "[i]nformation pertaining to an investigation
or a matter in which a criminal charge has been filed; or" "[c]onfi-
dential information or victim information; and" "[t]he reasonable
redaction of the recording would not safeguard potential evidence,"
the request may properly be denied.210 If denied, the requester may
then appeal to "the Court of Common pleas with jurisdiction over
the matter.'211 A police agency or prosecuting attorney, however,
may release such footage "with or without a written request.'212
This allows police departments and district attorneys to act "proac-
tively when there's a case of public interest" as Pennsylvania's Of-
fice of Open Records Executive Director Erik Arneson explains.213
Arneson further notes that significant portions of the Act 22 legis-
lation track Right to Know Law hence minimizing confusion and
providing for transparency.214 Ultimately, Arneson believes that if
used properly body cameras "can be a benefit to both police and the
public. "215
sent at the time of the recording, unless unknown and not reasonably ascertainable." Re-
questing Audio/Video Recordings from the PA State Police, PA. ST. POLICE,
https://www.psp.pa.gov/contact/Pages/REQUESTING-AUDIO-AND-VIDEO-RECORD
INGS-FROM-THE-PENNSYLVANIA-STATE-POLICE. aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
207. Requesting Police Recordings, OFF. OPEN RECORDS, https://www.openrecords.pa.gov/
RTKL/PoliceRecordings.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
208. PA. STATE POLICE, supra note 174, at 16.
209. Pennsylvania District Attorneys Issue Best Practices on Body-Worn Cameras, PA.
DISTRICT ATT'YS ASS'N (May 23, 2018), https://www.pdaa.org/pennsylvania-district-attorneys
-issue-best-practices-on-body-worn-cameras.
210. Requesting Police Recordings, supra note 207.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Christian Menno, Bucks, Montco Police Focus on the Pros, Cons of Body Cameras,
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III. BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Body-worn cameras will not provide a sea change in police-citizen
relations. The devices can certainly improve the criminal justice
system; however, this must be done within its existing framework.
When implementing a body-worn camera program, departments
should focus on using the cameras as a means of collecting evidence.
While body-worn camera footage can be greatly beneficial in deter-
mining what occurred during an encounter, video evidence of any
type is not without its flaws and hence should be primarily utilized
in a courtroom where the factfinder is properly instructed on the
applicable law and may receive additional evidence regarding the
surrounding circumstances at play when the video was made. Ad-
ditionally, public access to all body camera footage greatly threat-
ens the privacy interests of parties-police officers, victims, sus-
pects, and bystanders-recorded in the video. Hence, when imple-
menting a body-worn camera program the interests of the parties
involved should be placed before any public interest in viewing the
footage. The approach used in Pennsylvania provides a model for
body-worn camera policy because it emphasizes the collection of ev-
idence and the protection of parties featured in body-worn camera
footage while still enabling police and prosecutors to release video
when it is determined to be appropriate to do so.
The standard by which excessive use of force claims are evaluated
diverges from what most people consider acceptable police behav-
ior.216 The creation of a record of police action is undeniably valua-
ble in addressing excessive use of force claims; however, the reason-
ableness standard is a permissible one, which allows for police to
exercise discretion.217 It takes into consideration the split-second
decisions police officers must make. Importantly, the determina-
tion is made from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer on the scene,
not from the viewpoint of the suspect or that of a reasonably pru-
dent person.218 When body-worn camera video is released to the
public, it will likely be interpreted under an improper standard thus
generating disapproval of the police where perhaps the action was,
in fact, legally permissible. Certainly, body-worn cameras will rec-
ord both justified and unjustified uses of force; however, without the
proper instruction and the presentation of other relevant evidence
the public cannot accurately determine whether police acted out-
side the scope of their authority.
216. Meares et al., supra note 12, at 300.




As human beings, we inherently understand the need to make
discretionary and split-second judgment calls, such as when driving
a vehicle. Even in the very operation of body-worn cameras, it has
been recognized that police officers must retain discretion to deter-
mine when to turn the devices on and off in order to protect the
privacy rights of victims in sensitive situations. In other words, a
police officer will always be required to exercise discretion in per-
forming his or her job whether or not the officer's actions are rec-
orded. Consequently, the desire for increased accountability and
transparency cannot come at the expense of discretion. Rather, the
focus should be on defining the acceptable level of deviance from
stated parameters and training officers to adhere to promulgated
body camera policies. For example, a police department might list
encounters during which it expects officers to record, such as traffic
stops, arrests, searches, and foot pursuits.219 However, given the
rapidly evolving circumstances of police-citizen encounters, these
rules likely will not be followed absolutely. For instance, an officer
may neglect to turn on the camera if he or she suddenly and unex-
pectedly becomes involved in a foot pursuit. Where such an incident
occurs, rather than objectively punishing officers for failure to rec-
ord, supervisors should ask the officer to give a justifiable reason
for failing to record thereby channeling discretion rather than elim-
inating it.
Notably, the Minneapolis Police Department took steps to pro-
vide increased public accountability by providing both raw footage
and a "stabilized" video of the officer involved shooting of Thurman
Blevins.220 No charges were filed against the officers because, as
determined by the Hennepin County Attorney, Blevins presented a
danger to the officers and the community.221 The "stabilized" video
includes footage from the body cameras of each of the officers in-
volved, as well as a red circle indicating the gun on Blevins' per-
son.222 While the addition of the circle may shape "the perspective
of the person ... watching,"223 the view of an officer on scene is the
relevant perspective when making a legal determination as to the
219. Police Body Camera Policies: Recording Circumstances, upra note 147.
220. Mara H. Gottfried, What Do You See When You Watch the Police Shooting of Thur-
man Blevins Video? We Asked Experts What They Noticed, PIONEER PRESS (Aug. 1, 2018,
11:17 AM), https://www.twincities.com/2018/07/31/thurman-blevins-video-shooting-minne-
apolis-experts-legal-use-of-force/.
221. Id.; see also Kelly Busche, County Attorney Announces No Charges in Fatal Shooting
of Thurman Blevins, PIONEER PRESS (July 31, 2018, 8:47 AM), https://www.twincities.com/
2018/0 7/30/hennepin-county- attorney- mike-freeman- statementfatal-police -shooting-vide -
thurman-blevins-minneapolis/.
222. Gottfried, supra note 220.
223. Id.
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reasonableness of the use of force.224 Moving forward, more depart-
ments may consider the approach taken by Minneapolis because it
not only provides transparency by showing what happened but fur-
ther serves to educate the public by attempting to illustrate why the
incident occurred and why the charges were dropped.
Over time, as more footage becomes available for review, the foot-
age should be used to provide training and to identify how far dis-
cretion can go before it exceeds the scope of the officer's authority.
Where actions deviate, those actions must be considered in a court
of law. Holding police officers accountable to the communities they
serve ultimately lies in presenting evidence to a jury of their peers
rather than the court of public opinion. Body-worn camera footage
will provide especially valuable evidence of police-citizen encoun-
ters; however, footage is only one potential piece of evidence that
can be presented at trial. Often, the footage will not include critical
events leading up to the incident. Also, the footage only shows one
perspective or angle of the encounter and video evidence remains
subject to the individual biases of jury members. During an exces-
sive use of force case, additional witnesses may help fill in the gaps
the general public does not see in footage shared in the media.
Moreover, the jury will receive instruction on the applicable law the
general public will lack. Thus, while body camera footage will un-
doubtedly aid a jury in reaching its decision, it is but one piece of
evidence amongst all the other testimony, physical evidence, and
overall impression that our criminal justice system asks a jury to
evaluate in making its decision.
The implementation of dashboard camera video illustrates that
the use of body-worn cameras will likewise serve primarily eviden-
tiary purposes. While activists in the 1990s and early 2000s viewed
the installation of dashboard cameras as a way to track and prevent
instances of racial profiling, dashboard video has failed to do so. 225
Rather, dashboard camera footage has been most useful in prose-
cuting drunk driving and drug trafficking cases.226 Through new
technology, the ability to use dashboard camera to gather evidence
has only increased. Rather than expanding as a model in prevent-
ing racism from entering into police practices, the devices' capabil-
ities for evidence collection grew. A similar process will likely occur
with body-worn cameras. Thus, police departments must continue
to seek other solutions to repair damaged relations with the com-
munity and improve public perception.
224. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
225. Meyer, supra note 67.
226. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 78, at 22.
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Legislation enacted in Pennsylvania properly emphasizes body-
worn cameras as an evidence collection tool and protects the privacy
interest of parties involved.227 By enabling officers to wear body
cameras into private residences, the Pennsylvania General Assem-
bly greatly expanded police officers' ability to capture and collect
evidence. The increased ability to record, though, simultaneously
increases the potential for infringement upon the privacy rights of
citizens. By amending Right-to-Know law to prevent the public
from accessing body-worn camera footage, the Pennsylvania Gen-
eral Assembly properly directed body-worn cameras to function as
evidence collection tools. The separate procedure for obtaining body
camera footage will ultimately be easier to follow than the hodge-
podge of inclusions and exclusions established in other states.
Moreover, creating a separate procedure for obtaining body camera
footage the Pennsylvania Legislature acknowledges the increased
sensitivity of body-worn camera footage as compared to other rec-
ords available under the Right-to-Know law.
Some body-worn camera proponents believe the Pennsylvania
General Assembly defeated the purpose of the devices by limiting
release; however, that argument rests on the premise that account-
ability can only come from public access. The impetus for change,
however, comes not from publicly airing video, but from police de-
partments feeling the pressure to use the footage as a tool to iden-
tify individual and structural problems within departments, re-
shape policy, and provide officers with better training.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rather than the panacea hoped for following the unrest in Fer-
guson, Missouri, it is clear the most useful function of body-worn
cameras will be evidentiary. The brief history of video technology
in policing shows recordation does not provide a solution to deep-
reaching structural problems within police departments. Rather,
body-worn cameras are simply a tool. While footage may be used to
227. See generally Pennsylvania District Attorneys Issue Best Practices on Body-Worn
Cameras, supra note 209. See also id. for a discussion about this issue from Chester County
District Attorney, Tom Hogan:
Pennsylvania legislators worked hard to amend the law to make it possible for
the police to deploy body-worn cameras. Now that the law is in place, these best
practices provide some simple and common sense guidelines for police to follow
in using body cameras to ensure the integrity of prosecutions .... the recording
in a potential criminal matter must be treated as evidence, preserved and safe-
guarded. If there are charges in the case, the recording will be turned over as
evidence. These and other straightforward rules make the roll-out of body-worn
cameras more effective for both law enforcement and the public.
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ascertain problematic patterns within police departments or cer-
tain corrupt officers, documentation alone is not enough. Police de-
partments must develop and implement further training based on
identified issues in order for the effect to be felt in the community.
Within this framework, officer discretion remains necessary. As
such, the public must come to understand that whether a police of-
ficer's actions were legally justified may not be apparent upon a
public viewing of the video with untrained eyes. Legal standards
for the proper exercise of police authority differ from what most cit-
izens consider generally acceptable. Consequently, the public must
reckon with the fact police officers exercise discretion, and some-
times there will be deviations when exercising that discretion. In
turn, police departments must rain officers to use discretion
properly and within acceptable deviations. Body-worn camera foot-
age can be especially useful in facilitating such training by showing
recruits real-life encounters that fall within or without an accepta-
ble use of discretion and by reviewing current officers' actions.
These benefits, though, take place over time within the department
and do not provide the public the oversight many felt body-worn
cameras would offer. Furthermore, the process of properly drafting
policies, obtaining, and training officers to use body-worn camera
will take time. Thus, police departments must continue to imple-
ment other types of outreach, such as community policing, and work
to improve relations with the community on a greater scale.
While the public may clamor to view an incident, the privacy
rights of parties involved must remain paramount when drafting
body-worn camera legislation. Ultimately, body-worn camera foot-
age provides evidence that must be used within the bounds of the
criminal justice system. Within this system the enduring value of
body-worn camera footage will lie not in sharing it with the general
public, but in providing jurors, who represent he community, with
valuable evidence. Jurors may then use the footage, along with all
of the other evidence presented, to make a carefully considered eval-
uation based on the applicable law rather than in the court of public
opinion where while the outcry may be valid justice cannot properly
be done.
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